B    3    37T    137 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Gl  FT    OF 

U-fUWUSW, 

BIOLOGY, 

Class  LIBRARY; 


u 


AN    ANALYSIS    OF    THE    ACTION 

CONSCIOUSNESS,    BASED   ON 

THE  SIMPLE  REACTION 


THESIS   PRESENTED  TO  THE 

FACULTY  OF  CORNELL  UNIVERSITY  FOR  THE    DEGREE 
OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


JOSEPH  HERSCHEL  COFFIN 


1907 


AN    ANALYSIS    OF    THE    ACTION 

CONSCIOUSNESS,    BASED    ON 

THE  SIMPLE  REACTION 


THESIS   PRESENTED  TO  THE 

FACULTY  OF  CORNELL  UNIVERSITY  FOR  THE    DEGREE 
OF   DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


JOSEPH  HERSCHEL  COFFIN 


1907 


BIOLOGY^ 
LlBRARf 


THE  COMMONWEALTH    PRESS, 

O.  B.  WOOD, 
WORCESTER,   MASS. 


AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS 
BASED  ON  THE  SIMPLE  REACTION 


INTRODUCTION.1 

The  author  began  the  experiments  upon  which  this  paper 
is  based,  in  the  fall  of  1904,  with  the  view  of  ultimately  for- 
mulating some  sort  of  definition  of  voluntary  action,  and  of 
outlining,  as  accurately  as  might  be,  the  psychology  of  it. 
The  impulse  which  prompted  this  bit  of  research  seems  to 
have  been  one  in  common  with  a  general  impulse  toward  a 
more  complete  and  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  problem 
which  action  sets  to  psychology.  For,  within  the  last  year 
(1906),  a  number  of  articles  and  books  have  appeared, — 
notably  Ach's  Willensthatigkeit  und  das  Denken,  and  the 
Garmann  Festschrift, —  all  of  which  attack  the  problem  of 
will,  and  of  voluntary  action. 

Generally  speaking,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  phenomena 
of  voluntary  action  have  been,  and  are,  the  least  understood 
of  any  group  of  psychical  phenomena.  In  the  course  of  the 
development  of  psychology,  the  chapter  on  '  will '  has  inva- 
riably presented  great  difficulty  to  the  various  psychologists, 
no  matter  to  what  school  they  may  have  belonged.  It  has 
probably  provoked  more  sheer  speculation  than  any  other  set 
of  mental  phenomena,  and  also  lies  at  the  bottom  of  a  greater 
number  of  errors  and  misconceptions  than  anything  else. 
Moreover,  a  great  amount  of  the  confusion  which  has  arisen 
within  the  science  of  psychology  itself,  both  with  regard  to 
its  relation  to  the  other  sciences  and  to  philosophy,  can 
doubtless  be  traced  to  the  different  interpretations  which 
have  been  given  to  attention,  will  and  voluntary  action.  His- 
torically, at  least,  the  so-called  psychological  discussions  of 
will  have,  in  many  instances,  been  purely  metaphysical;  and 
where  not  so,  the  explanations  have  led  to  many  and  various 
logical  difficulties. 

So  it  is  not  surprising  that  Experimental  Psychology,  with 
its  more  advanced  methods,  and  keener  insight,  should  ap- 
proach the  problem  of  voluntary  action,  together  with  other 
higher,  more  intimate  and  more  purely  psychical  processes, 
with  hope  and  some  degree  of  confidence;  and  neither  is  it 

1  See  Appendix  F. 


175124 


4  COFFIN 

surprising  that  the  movement  should  be  a  general  one.  The 
history  of  science  reveals  the  fact  that  advancement  has 
usually  been  effected  by  independent,  but  simultaneous  dis- 
coveries by  different  individuals.  Hence,  in  relation  to  the 
above-mentioned  books  and  articles,  this  article  may  appear 
to  be  a  timely  one. 

The  Reaction  Experiment  has  had  a  long  and  varied  life, 
and  has  been  put  to  many  uses.  As  a  psychological  experi- 
ment, it  was  in  its  infancy  from  1820,  when  Bessel  began  to 
investigate  the  difference  in  observation  times  in  astronomy, 
and  discovered  what  he  called  the  'personal  equation,'  to 
1850,  when  the  need  was  felt  for  a  more  accurate  method  of 
observation,  and  the  Registration  Method  (chronoscope) 
was  introduced.  During  this  period  it  meant  little  more 
than  a  possible  means  of  standardizing  individual  differences, 
in  the  matter  of  correct  transit  observations.  In  1856, 
Mitchell  undertook  to  get  the  absolute  'personal  equation,' 
by  the  introduction  of  the  Reaction  Experiment  proper.  He 
called  it  the  'personality  of  the  eye,'  however,  thinking  it  a 
defect  of  that  organ.  And  in  this  connection,  Hartmann 
discovered  in  1858  that  expectation  and  surprise  greatly 
affect  the  personal  equation :  in  all  of  which  we  have  the 
glimmering  of  its  psychological  importance. 

Thus  the  Reaction  Experiment  was  rinding  its  way  into 
psychology  from  astronomy.  But  30  years  after  the  per- 
sonal equation  had  been  discovered  Helmholtz  (1850)  con- 
ceived the  idea  of  using  the  Reaction  Experiment  to  meas- 
ure the  rapidity  of  neural  excitation  and  transmission;  so 
physiology  became  interested  in  it  also,  at  a  very  early  date. 
It  was  about  this  time  that  Donders  worked  out  his  set  of 
experiments  on  the  rapidity  of  thought,  which  he  believed 
would  be  represented  by  the  difference  between  the  reaction 
time  and  the  physiological  time,  which  he  thought  he  already 
knew.  He  therefore  combined  the  physiological  and  psy- 
chological aspects  of  the  experiment  and  made  explicit  its 
psychological  value.  His  classic  A,  B,  and  C  methods  are 
familiar  to  every  one  who  is  familiar  with  the  Reaction  Ex- 
periment. And  it  was  upon  this  as  a  basis  that  Wundt  be- 
gan experimenting  on  the  Reaction  in  1861. 1 

lFor  a  History  of  the  Reaction,  see  Sanford,  A.  J.,  2,  pp. 
1-38. 

Cf.  Titchener,  "The  Leipsig  School,"  Mind,  1892, pp.  206- 
534;  and  Manual  of  Psychology,  Vol.  2,  Pt.  II,  p.  356  f. 

Also  note  that  Titchener  paralleled  his  exposition  of  action 
with  the  Reaction  Experiment  in  his  Primer  of  Psychology 
(1898),  and  in  his  Outlines  of  Psychology  (1895). 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  5 

During:  the  70's  there  were  many  reaction  experiments 
performed.  Exner  (Hermann's  Handbuch,  Vol.  II,  Pt.  I, 
pp.  262  ff.)  found  ten  different  researches,  one  of  the  impor- 
tant ones  of  which  was  that  carried  on  in  Helmholtz's  labo- 
ratory by  von  Kries  and  Aurbach  (Arch.  f.  Anatomy  u., 
Physiologic,  1877,  297  ff.),  the  object  of  which  was  to  find 
out  how  sensations  are  worked  up  into  ideas. 

Thus  far,  then,  we  have  noted  four  uses  to  which  the  Re- 
action Experiment  has  been  put;  (1)  in  astronomy, —  the 
personal  equation;  (2)  in  physiology, —  measurement  of  the 
rapidity  of  nerve  currents;  (3)  method  of  finding  rapidity  of 
thought;  and  (4)  a  way  of  studying  consciousness.  The  last 
two  have  significance  for  psychology,  and  it  is  plain  that 
Astronomy  and  Physiology  have  offered  Psychology  a  most 
fruitful  method  for  the  study  of  mental  processes. 

But  throughout  the  history  of  the  Reaction  Experiment, 
as  used  by  psychologists,  until  comparatively  recently,  the 
main  interest  has  always  been  the  temporal  measurement  of 
conscious  processes.  Great  tables  of  reaction  times  have 
been  made;  the  effects  of  practice,  fatigue,  warning  signals, 
strength  of  stimulus,  etc.,  were  worked  out  at  great  length, 
and  their  effects  on  the  reaction  times  noted.  Great  elabora- 
tion in  technique  was  made,  but  small  advance  in  introspective 
data,  as  to  the  constituents  of  the  action  consciousness  itself. 
Introspection  was  used  mainly  as  a  check  upon  the  experi- 
ment,— telling  the  direction  and  degree  of  attention,  etc. 

Without  doubt,  the  most  consistent  and  systematic  account 
of  the  Reaction  Experiment  for  psychology,  historically  con- 
sidered, has  been  Wundt's  treatment  of  it  in  the  various 
editions  of  his  Grundziige.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  in  the  early 
treatment  of  the  experiment,  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  the 
temporal  relation  of  the  ideas,  as  they  run  their  course ;  and 
it  is  the  chronoscopic  results  as  to  the  actual  time  duration 
of  the  various  processes  that  are  of  interest  to  him.  A  state- 
ment of  Wundt's  position  with  regard  to  the  Reaction  will 
probably  best  illustrate  the  general  attitude  toward  the  ex- 
periment, as  represented  in  the  literature  of  the  70's  and 
80's.  This  attitude  would  best  be  gleaned,  however,  from 
the  first  four  editions  of  the  Grundziige,  for  in  the  fifth  edi- 
tion, his  own  position  is  slightly  shifted  with  regard  to  the 
matter. 

The  fourth  division  of  the  first  edition  of  the  Grundziige 
(1874),  Wundt  devotes  to  a  consideration  of  "Consciousness 
and  the  Course  of  Ideas."  The  first  chapter  of  this  division 
takes  up  consciousness  and  attention.  Omitting,  for  the 
present  discussion,  his  analysis  and  characterization  of  at- 
tention as  such,  and  his  exposition  of  perception  and  apper- 


6  COFFIN 

ception,  the  important  point  in  connection  with  what  is  to 
follow,  is,  that  attention  is  regarded  as  the  first  condition  of 
all  clear  ideation.  The  second  chapter  of  this  division  is 
entitled,  "The  Course  and  Association  of  Ideas."  And  here 
it  is  that  the  discussion  of  the  Reaction  Experiment  occurs. 
According  to  this  account,  then,  there  are  two  ways  open  to 
the  psychologist  by  which  the  course  of  ideas  may  be  studied. 
One  may  either  seize  upon  and  analyze  the  course  of  memory 
images  which  constitutes  so  large  a  part  of  our  mental  life, 
or  one  may  investigate  the  changes  of  ideas  dependent  upon 
sensation, — i.  <?.,  those  that  are  originated  from  without. 
The  former  of  these  is  the  method  which  has  been  em- 
ployed heretofore.  But  at  the  basis  of  this  method  there 
lies  a  fundamental  fallacy:  viz.,  it  has  been  supposed  that  the 
course  of  the  ideas  repeats,  without  essential  change,  the 
temporal  course  of  the  original  sensations  ;  which  supposition 
need  not  be  true.  The  second  method,  then,  is  the  one  which 
must  be  adopted.  And  the  first  task,  accordingly,  is  to  in- 
vestigate the  general  laws  governing  the  temporal  course  of 
ideas  as  based  upon  experimental  investigation  of  the  rela- 
tion of  their  formation  and  succession,  to  the  original  outer 
stimulus.  Now  the  simplest  case  of  this  kind  is  given  when 
a  simple  sensation  is  perceived  as  a  stimulus,  in  response  to 
which  a  simple  movement  is  to  be  made,  when  the  impres- 
sion has  been  apperceived:  i.  e.,  attended  to.  To  supplement 
this,  it  is  necessary  to  have  some  sort  of  time  measuring 
apparatus, — some  way  of  determining  the  time  elapsing  be- 
tween the  giving  of  the  stimulus  and  the  muscular  response 
which  follows.  The  whole  situation  is  a  succession  of  very 
simple  mental  processes,  given  under  uniform  conditions, 
and  capable  of  being  investigated.  It  is  a  device  for  the 
study  of  the  course  of  ideas  ;  for  it  is  necessary  that  an  idea 
of  the  impression  shall  be  formed,  that  the  movement  shall 
be  determined  upon,  and  that  it  be  executed.  The  procedure 
may,  therefore,  be  factored  into  the  five  following  steps : 
(1)  The  transmission  of  the  nervous  impulse  toward  the 
centre,  (2)  the  perception  of  the  stimulus,  z.  £.,  the  entrance 
of  the  sensation  into  the  field  of  consciousness,  (3)  apper- 
ception, or  the  entrance  of  the  sensation  into  the  focus  of 
attention,  (4)  the  will-impulse,  the  willing  of  the  action,  and 
(5)  the  transmission  of  the  nervous  excitation  toward  the 
periphery.  Of  these,  the  first  and  last  are  purely  physio- 
logical, while  the  second,  third  and  fourth  are  psychological 
processes.  And  of  the  psychological  group,  the  middle  one, 
apperception,  is  most  important.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  how- 
ever, the  three  stand  in  very  close  relation,  for  in  the  first 
place,  perception  may  be  said  to  be  little  more  than  a  pre- 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  7 

liminary;  it  is  the  beginning  of  what,  in  its  completion  is  the 
clear,  distinct  apperception.  This  process  is  not  only  the 
most  important  intrinsically,  but  also  probably  consumes 
more  time  than  the  others.  In  the  second  place,  the  will- 
impulse  is  more  or  less  automatic  in  its  action, — the  move- 
ment having  already  been  determined  upon.  In  many  cases, 
to  be  sure,  the  will-impulse  seems  to  be  a  separate  act,  and 
to  be  so  recognized  in  introspection,  but  in  general  one  has 
no  knowledge  of  this  separateness,  but  rather  feels  the  two 
things  joined;  and  the  will-impulse  seems  to  be  merely  a 
fruition  of  the  potential  nature  of  the  apperception.  And,  in 
short,  we  can  do  no  better  than  to  group  all  five  processes 
together  and  call  the  resultant  complex,  the  'reaction  time.' 
Of  Jhis^we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  greater 
part "is^onsumed  by  the  psychical,  not  the  physiological  part 
ofTKe  process. 

Next  in  the  exposition,  Wundt  gives  the  norms  for  the 
various  sense  departments,  under  conditions  of  constant 
quality  and  intensity  of  stimulus  ; l  nothing,  however,  being 
said  of  the  various  types  of  reaction,  depending  upon  the 
direction  of  attention.  Moreover,  by  making  the  various 
stimuli  liminal,  he  finds  that  the  reaction  times  very 
markedly  approach  each  other,  as  to  length.  He  therefore 
concludes  that  the  apperception  time  in  all  cases  is  the  same  ; 
and  that,  where  variations  occur,  they  are  due  to  differences 
in  the  sense  departments  that  mediate  the  stimulus.  After 
this,  he  inquires  into  the  effect  of  intensity  upon  the  reaction 
time.  Here,  he  finds  that  in  general,  increased  intensity 
shortens  the  time,  in  cases  where  attention  has  been  con- 
stant.'2 He  also  worked  with  known  and  unknown  stimuli,8 
in  which  experiments  he  found  that  reaction  to  a  known 
stimulus  is  of  shorter  duration  than  that  to  an  unknown  one. 
Further,  he  gives  results  concerning  expectation  and  dis- 
tracting influences.4  Entirely  unexpected  stimuli  greatly 
increase  the  time,  and  the  presence  of  disturbing  noises 
likewise  lengthens  reaction  times.  In  these  and  other  com- 
plications mentioned,  the  thing  to  be  noted  is,  that  the  new 
or  changed  element  has  its  effect  upon  the  apperception  part 
of  the  psychical  process.  Therefore,  the  thing  to  be  empha- 
sized is,  that  the  nature,  and  temporal  course,  of  the  ideas  in 
that  given  moment  of  time  are  altered.  Their  kind,  number 
and  duration,  and  their  relation  to  each  other  in  the  complex 

"Grundziige  (1874),  p.  730  ff. 
2Grundzuge  (1874),  pp.  733  ff. 
8Grundziige  (1874),  pp.  741  ff. 
4Grundzuge  (1874),  pp.  743  ff. 


8  COFFIN 

changes  with  the  variations  of  the  conditions.  This  can  be 
measured  in  part,  at  least,  by  the  chronoscope.  No  other 
significance  seems,  then,  to  be  here  attached  to  the  Reaction 
Experiment,  than  that  it  is  a  means  of  exercising  some  ob- 
jective control  over  the  mental  processes  concerned  in  a 
simple  flow  of  ideas,  during  attention,  aroused  by  a  simple 
external  situation.  No  inkling  is  here  given  that  the  Reac- 
tion Experiment  furnishes  a  possible  means  of  studying  a 
cross-section  of  a  simple  action, — a  use  to  which  it  has  later 
been  put. 

In  the  second  edition  (1880)  Wundt  first  uses  the  term 
'simple  reaction.'  And,  following  the  first  edition,  the  ex- 
position of  it  is  found  in  the  chapter  entitled  "Apperception 
and  the  Course  of  Ideas," — the  heading  of  the  first  paragraph 
of  which  is,  "  Simple  Reaction  to  Sense  Impression."  The 
problem  is  stated  here  in  almost  the  same  words  as  used  in 
the  previous  edition ;  the  gist  of  which  is,  that  it  is  our  task 
to  investigate  the  course  of  ideas  in  a  simple  case  in  which 
a  simple  train  of  ideas  is  aroused  by  an  external  impression. 
And  as  a  method,  the  simple  reaction  will  serve  better  than 
anything  else.  Here,  the  reaction  is  factored  as  in  the  pre- 
vious treatment,  and  the  figures  used  in  regard  to  the  norms 
of  various  sense  departments  are  here  repeated,  no  mention 
being  made  as  yet  of  the  types  of  reaction.1  In  short,  the 
problems  taken  up  in  the  two  editions  are  the  same,  with  this 
exception :  in  the  second  edition,  he  has  discovered  a  further 
means  of  studying  apperception.  It  consists  in  the  compli- 
cation reaction. *  Here,  he  introduces  the  discrimination  and 
choice  reaction,  and  by  manipulating  the  results,  is  able  to 
obtain  temporal  values  for  the  interpolated  processes.  The 
impression  gained  from  a  comparison  of  the  two  editions  is 
that,  if  any  difference,  Wundt  uses  the  Reaction  Experiment 
more  consciously  and  more  systematically  to  illuminate  the 
course  of  ideas  in  the  second  than  in  the  first  edition.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  has  a  deeper  interest  in  the  Reaction  Ex- 
periment for  its  own  sake ;  he  is  inclined  to  develop  all  its 
possibilities,  as  far  as  he  sees  them,  and  to  make  the  system- 
atic application  later.  But  here,  as  before,  the  emphasis  is 
entirely  upon  the  course  of  the  ideas  during  the  reaction 
time. 

Again,  in  the  third  edition  (1887)  the  discussion  of  the 
Simple  Reaction  occurs  in  the  chapter  entitled  "Apperception 
and  the  Course  of  Ideas."  The  problem  here,  as  formerly, 
is  "the  investigation  of  the  general  ilaws  of  the  course  of 

'Grundziige  (1880),  pp.  219  ff. 
2Grundziige  (1880),  pp.  247  ff. 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  9 

ideas,  based  upon  the  experimental  investigation  of  the  re- 
lation of  their  temporal  formation  and  succession ;  to  which, 
is  added,  in  the  next  chapter,  a  second  task :  the  investiga- 
tion of  the  laws  of  the  association  of  ideas,  relying  upon 
introspection  of  their  course  freed  from  outer  influences  as 
much  as  possible."  And  here  again,  the  simplest  case  is 
found  in  the  simple  reaction.  Then  follows  the  factoring  of 
the  reaction  just  as  it  was  made  in  the  preceding  edition. 

The  main  advance  which  the  third  edition  makes  over  the 
first  and  second,  in  the  matter  of  the  analysis  of  the  simple 
reaction,  lies  in  the  fact  that  Wundt  here  accepts  and  incor- 
porates the  results  of  Lange  who  had  been  at  work  on  the 
factors  of  expectation  and  preparation.  Lange  said  that  the 
differences  in  the  reaction  times  were  not  to  be  referred  en- 
tirely to  differences  of  practice,  as  had  before  been  assumed, 
but  that  there  is  a  qualitative  difference  in  the  reaction,  yield- 
ing two  types,  depending  for  their  quality  upon  the  direction 
of  attention  before  and  during  the  reaction.  These,  he 
names  the  'extreme  muscular'  and  the  'extreme  sensorial.' 
In  the  first  instance,  the  observer  anticipates  the  motor  in- 
nervation  and  attends  to  the  movement  he  is  about  to  per- 
form; in  the  second  case,  the  whole  strain  of  attention  is 
thrown  toward  the  expected  stimulus.  This  distinction, 
Wundt  accepts  and  designates  the  types  the  '  muscular '  and 
the  '  sensorial.'  They  are  still  described,  however,  with  re- 
gard to  the  content  of  the  action  consciousness.  The  one 
type  is  explained  by  assuming  that  the  act  of  apperception 
is  entirely  eliminated,  and  that  perception  and  will-impulse 
probably  coincide  in  point  of  time.  The  sensorial  or  com- 
plete reaction  is  one  in  which  all  five  factors  are  found,  as 
outlined  above  (p.  7).  In  this  edition,  the  reaction  is  of 
more  intrinsic  interest  than  heretofore;  and  various  compli- 
cating factors,  such  as  unexpected  stimulus,  preparatory  sig- 
nal, distracted  attention,  the  effects  of  drugs  on  the  observer, 
etc.,  find  place  in  the  analysis;  and  false  reactions  and  pre- 
mature reactions  are  analyzed.  Besides  these,  the  com- 
pound reaction  is  further  developed.  Choice  reactions, — 
choice  between  movement  and  rest,  between  two  or  more 
movements, — discrimination  reactions  and  association  reac- 
tions are  all  developed  and  analyzed.  While  the  systematic 
place  of  all  these  things  is  to  be  found  in  relation  to  the 
course  of  ideas  during  the  period  of  reaction.  They  are  all 
made  to  illuminate  the  phenomena  of  conscious  processes 
which  have  their  existence  during  the  moment  of  time  under 
consideration. 

In  the  fourth  edition  (1893)  the  treatment  of  the  simple 
reaction  is  the  same  as  in  the  third,  whereas  the  compound 


10  COFFIN 

reaction  receives  more  attention.  The  association  reaction 
is  further  developed,  likewise  the  discrimination;  while  at 
the  close  a  few  paragraphs  are  devoted  to  the  subjects  of 
the  tendency  toward  automatic  co-ordination,  and  reflex 
movement  in  the  reaction,  and  their  effects  upon  it.  But  as 
regards  the  attitude  toward  the  reaction,  there  is  no  change. 
The  value  of  the  experiment  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  furnishes 
a  means  of  studying  the  ideational  content  of  mind  during  a 
given  measured  period  of  time. 

Before  considering  the  exposition  of  the  Reaction  Experi- 
ment as  set  forth  in  the  fifth  edition  of  the  Grundziige,  it  is 
necessary  to  notice  a  new  tendency  in  the  way  of  considering 
the  reaction.  From  what  has  preceded,  it  is  plain  that  the 
Reaction  Experiment  was  made  use  of,  up  to  this  time,  for 
any  one  of  four  things  :  (1)  to  obtain  reaction  norms  for 
their  own  sake,  (2)  as  an  experimental  control  for  determin- 
ing the  temporal  course  of  ideas.  It  was  assumed  that, 
since  it  takes  time  to  make  a  reaction,  there  must  be  some 
conscious  content  during  that  time,  which  conscious  content 
could  be  described  as  ideas.  The  reaction  then,  furnished 
a  means  for  factoring, — and  measuring  the  factors, — the  con- 
scious processes  contained  within  the  limits  of  the  reaction. 
The  assumption  upon  which  this  use  of  the  Reaction  Experi- 
ment was  based  seems  to  be  logical,  to  about  the  same  de- 
gree that  it  is  psychological.  (3)  A  large  list  of  experiments 
upon  the  determination  of  practice,  fatigue,  and  various  con- 
ditioning factors  of  the  reaction,  following  naturally  from 
(2).  (4)  A  large  number  of  experiments  with  the  view  of 
determining  the  various  types  of  reaction. 

In  addition  to  this,  the  experiment  was  made  use  of  quite 
extensively  during  the  90' s  with  the  view  of  determining  by 
its  aid,  mental  types;  and  also  as  a  differential  test  in  abnor- 
mal psychology  and  artificial  derangements.  But  little  use 
seems  to  have  been  made  of  Kiilpe's  suggestion  that  the 
reaction  is  a  simple  voluntary  action,  and  that  the  latter  is, 
therefore,  accessible  to  scientific  investigation.  Indeed,  the 
invest'igation  seems  to  have  received  such  impetus  in  the 
direction  already  remarked,  that  it  is  only  within  the  very 
immediate  past  that  the  action  consciousness  has  thus  been 
attacked  by  means  of  the  reaction. 

In  1893,  the  same  year  of  the  fourth  edition,  Kiilpe  made 
the  following  statement:  "the  reaction  is  an  action  in  re- 
sponse to  a  peripheral  stimulus;  and  thus,  action  is  accessi- 
ble to  scientific  investigation."  Looking  at  it  from  our 
present  vantage  point,  it  seems  strange  that  it  had  not  been 
considered  in  this  light  before.  But  the  reason  is  doubtless 
to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  interest  which  the  reaction 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  II 

brought  with  it  from  astronomy,  and,  later,  from  physiology, 
were  entirely  foreign  to  the  present  psychological  interest. 
The  original  impetus  was  in  the  direction  of  the  temporal 
measurement  of  mental  and  physiological  processes,  and, 
naturally,  the  investigation  followed  the  direction  already 
marked  out.  It  is  difficult  to  evaluate  the  net  result  of  the 
great  amount  of  experimentation  which  was  carried  on  along 
this  line  :  —  certainly  it  was  great.  But  the  fact  remains 
that  it  was  as  the  extreme  swing  of  the  pendulum;  the  reac- 
tion experiment  was  carried  past  the  point  where  it  could  do 
the  most  good  for  psychology.  Stress  was  laid  upon  what 
now  seems  to  us  to  be  secondary  considerations.  But  the 
reaction  experiment  was  eventually  to  find  its  rightful  place; 
and  it  was  doubtless  Kiilpe's  statement  that  formed  the  turn- 
ing point  at  which  the  new  beginning  should  be  made.  The 
new  attitude  is  also  reflected  in  Wundt,  for,  as  was  intimated 
above  (p.  5),  he  shifted  his  position  in  a  measure  to  con- 
form to  it. 

Accordingly,  in  the  fifth  edition  (1903)  of  his  Grundziige, 
Wundt  brings  the  chapter  containing  the  exposition  of  the 
reaction,  in  after  the  chapter  on  Will,  and  makes  many  ref- 
erences back  and  forth.  The  chapter  containing  the  discus- 
sion of  the  reaction,  is  entitled  "Consciousness  and  the 
Course  of  Ideas,"  and  is  treated  in  the  same  connection  as 
in  the  earlier  editions.  There  is,  however,  this  very  note- 
worthy change  of  attitude;  the  reaction,  which  has  hereto- 
fore been  used  to  determine  the  temporal  course  of  ideas, 
really  involves  an  act  of  will;  "the  reaction  process  is  a  will 
process,  which  is  set  up  by  an  outer  stimulus,  in  order  to 
terminate  in  a  movement  spontaneously  following  the  ap- 
perception of  the  stimulus,  which  movement  is  the  reaction 
movement."  "The  reaction  experiment  permits  the  analysis 
of  the  conscious  processes  during  action,  at  the  same  time 
recording  the  objective  time  between  the  stimulus  and  the 
movement."  And  again,  "  the  reaction  is  the  typical  form 
of  the  will  process  :  —  here  we  can  analyze  will  and  its  vari- 
ous processes."  These  statements  and  others  point  conclu- 
sively to  the  new  attitude  :  that  the  reaction  has  come  to 
mean  more  than  the  temporal  measurement  of  a  set  of  men- 
tal processes  which  follow  each  other  in  point  of  time.  It 
has  come  to  be  a  matter  of  studying  a  simple  voluntary 
action. 

In  regard  to  the  analysis  of  the  simple  reaction,  the  follow- 
ing may  be  noted :  It  is  here  factored  as  in  the  preceding 
editions,  with  the  exception  that  the  first  and  fifth  events  — 
physiological  —  are  divided  yet  further.  The  first  may  be 
supposed  to  consist  of  (i)  the  stirring  up  of  the  sense  organ, 


12  COFFIN 

and  (ii)  the  conduction  of  the  nerve  current  to  the  appropri- 
ate nerve  centre.  The  fifth  consists  of  (i)  the  conduction  of 
the  peripheral  excitation  from  the  appropriate  centre,  and 
(ii)  the  excitation  of  the  muscle.  The  processes  (2),  per- 
ception, and  (3)  apperception,  and  (4)  will  impulse,  may 
overlap  each  other,  or  some  of  them  may  coincide,  or  be 
lacking  (cf.  above).  The  simple  reaction,  as  an  action, 
may  thus  be  further  analyzed.  The  simplest  case  of  re- 
sponding to  an  outer  stimulus  is  to  be  found  when  we  await 
a  given  sensation  which  is  to  be  raised  to  an  idea,  and  with- 
out the  interpolation  of  other  processes,  to  make  a  simple 
pre-determined  movement  upon  its  apprehension.  It  con- 
tains, as  psychical  processes,  the  following  things  :  the  per- 
ception of  the  stimulus,  entrance  into  consciousness,  the  ap- 
perception, or  entering  into  the  focus  of  attention,  and  the 
formation  of  the  will-impulse.  A  sensation,  by  virtue  of 
being  a  sensation,  lies  in  the  field  of  consciousness  and  ac- 
companies the  stirring  up  of  the  central  mental  tract,  and  is, 
therefore,  a  psychophysical  event.  An  especial  activity, 
which  we  perceive  subjectively,  is  necessary  in  order  to 
direct  the  attention  to  such  a  sensation.  But  this  may  also 
be  a  psychophysical  event,  for  there  is  probably  a  nervous 
change  corresponding  to  it.  Finally,  the  will  impulse,  which 
closely  follows  apperception,  is  in  the  apperception  of  the 
out-going  movement.  In  the  simple  reaction,  this  consists 
of  the  impulsive  apprehension  immediately  following  the 
apprehension  of  the  stimulus  which  takes  place  at  the  same 
time  that  the  excitation  of  the  central  motor  tract  is  supposed 
to  occur.  Therefore,  the  will  impulse  may  also  be  consid- 
ered to  be  psychophysical. 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Wundt,  in  his  last  edition, 
feels  the  force  of  the  argument  in  favor  of  regarding  the 
reaction  as  the  type  of  all  voluntary  action  in  general,  it  is 
noteworthy  that  he  still  treats  it  as  a  way  of  studying  the 
course  of  ideas,  the  course  of  ideas  during  action.  But  he 
gives  us  nothing  particularly  new  with  regard  to  the  psycho- 
logical facts;  merely  a  new  attitude  toward  the  facts.  On 
the  other  hand,  Kiilpe,  at  the  time  that  he  made  the  state- 
ment that  the  reaction  is  a  simple  voluntary  action  in 
response  to  a  stimulus,  says,  "the  duration  of  the  reaction  is 
dependent  upon  external  and  internal  conditions.  .  .  . 
The  changes  which  are  due  to  the  internal  conditions  are  of 
greater  psychological  importance  (than  the  external).  Be- 
sides altering  the  duration  of  the  whole  act,  they  usually 
imply  a  qualitative  modification  of  its  contents.  Especially 
important  in  this  connection,  is  the  preparation  of  the  subject 
for  the  reaction."  (Outlines,  p.  407.)  And  again:  "The 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   ACTION     CONSCIOUSNESS  1$ 

essential  dependence  of  the  whole  process  upon  the  intensity 
of  the  preparation,  is  shown  by  the  marked  influence  of  the 
time  allowed  for  the  concentration  of  the  attention  upon  the 
rapidity  of  the  reaction."  Now  this  preparation  lies  in 
the  conscious  state  of  expectation.  There  is  an  apperceived 
idea  either  of  the  impression,  in  which  case  we  have  the 
sensorial  reaction,  or  of  the  movement  to  be  made,  in  which 
case  we  have  the  muscular  type.  This  apperceived  idea, 
using  Wundt's  terminology,  is  accompanied  by,  and  is  fused 
with,  the  muscular  adjustments  that  are  characteristic  of  the 
corresponding  type.  Hence,  when  the  impression  comes, 
the  movement  goes  off.  In  the  ordinary  way  of  conducting 
the  reaction  experiment,  then,  the  period  between  the  signal 
and  the  stimulus, — the  time  of  preparation, — is,  for  Kiilpe, 
the  most  important  one.  For  the  nature  of  the  preparation 
determines  the  quality  and  nature  of  the  reaction.  Here, 
then,  is  something  entirely  new;  while  holding  that  the  reac- 
tion is  a  type  of  voluntary  action  in  general,  Kiilpe  goes  a 
step  further  and  says  that  the  mental  antecedents  of  the 
reaction — the  preparation — are  the  most  important  thing. 
While  in  sharp  contrast  to  this  attitude,  and  in  correspond- 
ence to  his  previous  conception  of  it,  is  Wundt's  way  of 
regarding  the  reaction.  While  recognizing  that  the  direction 
which  attention  takes  is  largely  responsible  for  the  nature  of 
the  reaction,  it  is  the  actual  content  of  consciousness  at  the 
time  of  the  reaction  itself  to  which  he  attaches  importance. 
This  content  is  the  so-called  perception,  apperception,  and 
will  impulse ;  and  it  is  this  in  which  he  is  interested.  To 
make  the  contrast  more  explicit,  Kiilpe  regards  the  time  of 
preparation  for  the  action, — from  the  'now'  to  the  stimulus, — 
as  the  most  important,  while  Wundt  still  clings  to  the  notion 
that  the  conscious  content  from  the  stimulus  to  the  move- 
ment is  the  important  part.  This,  then,  shall  be  one  part  of 
the  problem  set  before  us  in  this  paper,  which  we  shall  en- 
deavor to  answer.  We  shall  try  to  determine  from  a  great 
mass  of  introspective  data  obtained  from  the  simple  reaction, 
which  of  these  two  periods  in  the  process  of  action  is  of 
greatest  psychological  importance. 

In  approaching  the  action  consciousness  by  way  of  the 
simple  reaction,  it  may  be  well  to  get  clearly  in  mind  the 
reasons  why  the  reaction  may  be  used  in  this  way.  Kiilpe 
says  (Outlines,  p.  407),  "the  reaction  is  simply  the  exact 
type  of  all  actions,  as  they  are  termed  in  the  psychology  of 
everyday  life,  which  are  initiated  by  an  external  stimulus. 
.  .  .  It  is  not  difficult  (p.  409)  to  discover  analogies  be- 
tween the  forms  of  the  simple  reaction  and  certain  activities 
or  actions  in  everyday  life.  Every  one  must  have  had  ex- 


14  COFFIN 

periences  which  recall  the  premature  or  erroneous  reaction ; 
and  every  one  knows  the  difference  between  two  actions,  one 
of  which  is  continuously  directed  by  the  idea  of  end,  while 
the  other  is  accomplished  step  by  step,  as  it  were,  each  stage 
in  its  execution  requiring  special  preparation.  When  the 
series  of  factors  involved  in  an  action  has  become  familiar 
by  long  practice,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  advantage  of 
a  constant  idea  of  its  ultimate  end."  Now  why  can  we  say 
that  *  'the  reaction  is  the  exact  type  of  all  action?"  If  we 
may  define  action  provisionally  and  in  general  terms,  as  con- 
consciously  conditioned  movement,  i.  e.,  movement  which 
has  motive,  conscious  antecedents  and  concomitant  kinaes- 
thetic  sensations — movement  with  a  psychophysical  set,  it  is 
plain  that  the  simple  reaction  may  justly  be  termed  an  ac- 
tion, because  it  fulfills  the  conditions  : — provided  the  reaction 
is  taken  before  it  has  had  time  to  become  automatized,  or  in 
Wundt's  terms,  a  cerebral  reflex.  The  simple  reaction  un- 
doubtedly has  conscious  antecedents  of  the  most  definite 
kind.  If  there  are  to  be  conscious  antecedents,  the  mind 
must  be  in  a  state  of  attention,  and  this  we  have  to  a  very 
g'reat  degree  in  the  case  of  preparation.  The  attentive  state 
and  all  it  signifies  is  the  conscious  antecedent  of  the  reac- 
tion, and  this  conscious  preparation  is  certainly  as  distinctly 
present  in  the  reaction  as  it  is  in  ordinary  life.  Following 
Wundt,  nothing  could  be  more  conscious  than  the  perception, 
apperception  and  will  impulse  found  in  the  action.  If  there 
is  any  difference  in  the  conscious  conditions  of  the  reaction 
and  ordinary  action,  the  former  is  more  distinctly  conscious 
than  the  latter.  In  regard  to  the  consequences  in  the  two 
cases,  the  affective  tone,  which  constitutes  the  bulk  of  the 
after  effects,  may  be,  and  probably  is,  in  the  reaction  more 
indifferent  than  in  most  ordinary  actions.  But  this  is  due 
rather  to  the  simplicity  of  the  reaction,  than  to  any  quali- 
tative difference  as  to  the  nature  of  the  two  things.  Again, 
since  the  reaction  is  a  movement  in  response  to  a  stimulus, 
which  definition  implies  consciousness  as  a  condition,  it  be- 
comes evident  that  it  is  at  least  a  case  of  action  whether  it  is 
the  type  of  action  or  not,  from  the  very  definition.  But,  so 
far  from  being  merely  a  case  of  action,  it  seems  that  the 
reaction  is  also  the  type  of  action,  for  several  reasons. 
First,  it  is  undeniable  that  all  action,  properly  speaking, 
implies  bodily  movement  of  some  sort,  and  that  the  move- 
ment follows  upon  stimulation  of  some  sort, — using  'stimu- 
lation' in  its  broadest  sense  to  mean  both  inducement  and 
incentive,  implying  both  external  and  internal  excitation. 
Now  the  reaction  seems  to  be  the  simplest  case  in  which 
these  various  factors  are  found,  nevertheless,  it  seems  to 


ANALYSIS  OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  15 

contain  all  the  essentials  of  voluntary  action.  To  be  sure, 
the  movement  in  voluntary  action  may  be  ever  so  complex, 
e.  g.,  the  movements  involved  in  writing,  but  it  is  still  move- 
ment in  response  to  some  stimulus.  Likewise,  the  stimulus, 
so  far  from  being  merely  one  simple  expected  sensation, 
may  come  from  any  part  of  our  varied  conscious  experience, 
— a  sensation  or  sensation  complex  or  a  benevolent  impulse, 
but  it  is  still  a  stimulus.  In  other  words,  the  reaction  is 
voluntary  action  reduced  to  its  lowest  terms.  It  is  volun- 
tary action  with  as  many  of  the  complicating  factors  ruled 
out,  as  it  is  possible  to  obtain  it.  Attention  is  narrowed 
down,  and  directed  to  some  one  expected  impression,  or 
some  movement  pertinent  to  the  reaction  experiment,  in- 
stead of  being  busied  with  the  larger  affairs  of  professional 
life,  in  which  case,  every  particular  stimulus  has  to  be 
attended  to  after  it  comes,  and  the  appropriate  movement 
both  selected  and  executed  afterward.  Moreover,  in  most 
ordinary  action,  there  is  nothing  that  corresponds  to  the 
'ready'  signal  of  the  reaction.  The  stimulus  simple  breaks 
in  upon  consciousness  unheralded,  and  attention  has  after- 
ward to  be  adjusted,  or  preparation  for  the  movement  has  to 
be  effected  after  the  stimulus  has  been  received,  instead  of 
before.  And  more  than  that,  instead  of  there  being  one 
particular  movement  or  set  of  movements,  ready  prepared 
for,  so  that  they  go  off  as  soon  as  the  stimulus  has  been 
apperceived,  the  right  movement  must  be  executed.  But 
everywhere  and  always,  action  is  consciously  conditioned 
movement  in  response  to  some  stimulus ;  hence,  in  all  fair- 
ness it  may  be  said  that  the  reaction  represents  voluntary 
action  in  its  simplest  terms.  With  regard  to  that  which  we 
ordinarily  term  volitional  action,  which  term  indicates  the 
more  subjective  nature  of  the  stimulus,  we  have  merely  to 
widen  the  meaning  of  the  term  'stimulus'  in  order  to  make 
it  include  those  more  subjective  promptings  which  charac- 
terize those  acts.  Thus  defined,  action  is  still  consciously 
conditioned ;  the  stimulus  is  still  a  conscious  affair,  indeed 
more  intimately  conscious,  if  any  difference,  than  the  more 
objective  stimulus,  the  sensation,  and  movement  results  as 
a  consequence. 

If,  then,  the  action  consciousness  may  thus  be  considered 
as  a  type  of  voluntary  action,  it  follows  that  a  thorough 
analysis  of  the  reaction  will  of  necessity  throw  some  light 
upon  voluntary  action  in  general.  If  by  an  introspective 
analysis  of  the  simple  reaction,  we  are  able  to  determine 
what  the  actual  constituent  processes  are,  and  which  of  them 
is  of  most  importance  we  shall  have  added  something  to  the 
sum-total  of  the  psychological  knowledge  concerning  volun- 
tary action. 


1 6  COFFIN 

And  it  is  with  this  that  Part  I  has  to  deal. 

PART  I 
THE  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  SIMPLE  REACTION 

The  following  analysis  is  based  upon  the  introspective  re- 
sults from  a  set  of  reactions  of  the  auditory  type.  It  would 
have  been  interesting  as  well  as  valuable  to  have  had  an 
equal  amount  of  introspective  data  from  experiments  from 
other  sense  departments.  But  such  would  have  required 
more  time  than  was  at  the  disposal  of  the  author;  and,  be- 
sides, it  may  be  assumed  that  what  is  essential  of  action  in 
response  to  an  auditory  stimulus,  would  likewise  be  essential 
to  a  simple  reaction  to  a  stimulus  from  any  other  sense  organ. 

Five  observers  were  used.  Miss  Murray  (M)  was  Scholar 
in  the  Department  of  Psychology,  and  had  had  three  years 
of  psychological  work.  She  had  done  the  reaction  experi- 
ment as  outlined  in  Titchener's  Manual  of  Psychology,  three 
years  before,  so  had  had  some  practice  in  introspective  work 
of  this  kind.  Miss  Peirson  (P)  was  a  junior  in  Cornell  and 
was  in  her  second  year  of  psychological  work.  Mrs.  Patti- 
son  (Pn)  had  had  about  the  same  amount  of  psychological 
training  as  Miss  Pierson.  Both  ladies  had  done  the  reaction 
experiment  before,  in  the  drill  course  in  Cornell.  Mr.  Fos- 
ter (F)  was  doing  his  second  year  of  graduate  work.  He 
was  a  thoroughly  conscientious  student  with  some  psycho- 
logical training,  but  had  never  done  the  reaction  experiment. 
To  Mrs.  Coffin  (C),  the  reaction  was  entirely  new,  as  she 
had  had  no  introspective  training. 

As  the  recording  instrument,  the  vernier  chronoscope  was 
used.  This  instrument  was  chosen  for  three  reasons,  in  pref- 
erence to  the  Hipp  chronoscope,  which  was  at  hand,  and 
might  have  been  used.  First,  great  accuracy  was  not  de- 
manded. The  times  were  used  merely  as  a  check  upon  the 
introspections,  the  great  weight  being  thrown  upon  the  latter; 
second,  the  experimenter  wished  to  be  near  the  observer, 
that  he  might  observe  him;  and  third,  the  experimenter 
wished  to  be  able  to  question  the  observer  as  occasion  arose.1 

The  order  of  the  experiment  was  as  follows  :  A  *  ready' 
was  given,  at  which  the  observer  closed  his  eyes  and  laid  the 
index  finger  of  the  right  hand  on  the  key  of  the  short  pendu- 
lum. After  two  seconds,  the  experimenter  said  "now,"  and 
in  two  more  seconds  tapped  the  key  of  the  long  pendulum, 
which  was  the  signal  for  reacting.  Fifty  'Natural'  reactions 
were  taken  from  each  observer,  and  approximately  200 
'Muscular'  and  'Sensorial'  reactions  respectively. 

1  See  Appendix  A. 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   ACTION   CONSCIOUSNESS  17 

The  instructions  for  the  Natural  Reaction  were  as  follows: 
"At  the  'ready'  you  are  to  place  the  finger  upon  the  key, 
close  your  eyes,  and  assume  a  comfortable  bodily  position. 
At  the  'now,'  prepare  for  reacting  by  concentrating  your  at- 
tention; and  upon  hearing  the  stimulus,  push  the  finger 
down.  Then,  with  eyes  still  closed,  and  bodily  position  un- 
changed, you  are  to  recall  the  experiment  as  vividly  as  possi- 
ble and  immediately  afterward,  write  out  a  full  occount  of 
it."  Since  time  was  taken  for  the  observer  to  write  out  his 
introspections,  ten  reactions  per  day  were  as  many  as  could 
profitably  be  taken,  as  more  would  have  been  fatiguing. 

The  Natural  Reaction  which  was  taken  up  first,  served 
mainly  as  a  preliminary  to  those  which  followed.  Not  a 
great  deal  of  value,  introspectively,  was  obtained  from  them. 
To  some  of  the  observers,  the  reaction  was  entirely  new, 
while  the  others  were  more  or  less  rusty  in  that  sort  of  in- 
trospection, hence  the  main  value  of  it  was  to  accustom  the 
observers  to  the  method,  and  to  teach  them  the  kind  of  ob- 
servation that  was  required.  In  addition,  the  novelty  of  the 
experiment  was  allowed  to  wear  away,  and  the  main  features 
were  allowed  to  become  evident. 

It  might  seem  that  the  very  fact  of  practice  would  alter 
the  conditions  and  thereby  change  the  content  of  conscious- 
ness; that  introspection  would  accordingly  be  changed,  and 
steps  fundamentally  important  to  the  natural  reaction  be 
dropped  out.  This  may  be  true,  and  probably  is  to  some 
extent,  but  the  loss  is  partially  recompensed  by  the  added 
facility  in  introspection,  and  the  standardizing  of  the  condi- 
tions which  gives  opportunity  for  more  than  a  single  view  of 
the  reaction. 

The  photograph  of  the  action  consciousness  is  best  taken 
just  after  the  experiment.  One  can  then  put  oneself  through 
it  again  just  as  it  was  experienced.  The  various  elements 
and  processes  can  be  enumerated,  dwelt  upon,  compared  and 
fixed  in  memory  till  they  can  be  written  down.  The  stability 
of  introspection  depends  upon  practice  sufficient  to  rid  one 
of  the  feeling  of  novelty,  to  make  one  at  home  with  the  ex- 
periment, and  to  enable  the  important  and  elemental  proc- 
esses to  sift  themselves  out  and  assume  bold  relief  in  the 
whole  picture.  But  it  is  also  true  that  habits  in  the  way  of 
reaction  very  soon  form;  and  introspection  cannot  be  of 
much  value  after  the  experiment  [has  become  stereotyped. 
And  sooner  or  later,  in  spite  of  the  experimenter's  instruc- 
tions, and  the  good  intentions  on  the  part  of  the  observer, 
the  experiment  is  bound  to  traverse  the  same  paths  after  a 
certain  number  of  repetitions. 

2 


I 8  COFFIN 

A.     THE  NATURAL  REACTION.1 

In  the  natural  reaction,  the  attention  upon  which  the  whole 
nature  of  the  reaction  depends,  is  at  first  distributed  over  the 
whole  experiment  in  a  confused  sort  of  way.  No  determined 
mode  of  procedure  or  system  has  yet  been  established.  Now 
one  thing,  now  another  claims  the  attention ;  the  stimulus, 
the  movement  to  be  made,  an  anxiety  to  perform  the  experi- 
ment satisfactorily,  strain  sensations,  images,  feelings  of 
unreadiness,  and  many  other  things  get  their  share.  In  a 
word,  complex  feelings,  and  higher  mental  processes  mingle 
with  simpler  and  more  elemental  ones  to  form  a  general 
chaotic  state.  The  events  from  the  '  now '  to  the  reception 
of  the  stimulus  constitute  a  new  experience,  and  there  is  no 
predetermined  way  of  getting  ready  for,  or  receiving  the 
stimulus  as  is  the  case  after  practice.  Each  experiment 
stands  apart  from  all  others  and  is  of  its  own  peculiar  kind, 
having  its  own  peculiar  contents  and  conditions.  There  can 
be  nothing  particularly  predicted  of  them  as  a  class,  except 
that  their  nature  depends  upon  the  mood  of  the  observer  as 
he  goes  into  the  experiment.  If  he  has  a  feeling  that  the 
preceding  experiment  was  not  carried  out  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  experimenter,  as  to  introspective  results,  reaction 
times,  etc.;  if  he  has  not  gained  the  upper  hand  of  the  experi- 
ment, and  other  similar  misgivings,  the  contents  and  condi- 
tions of  consciousness  during  reaction  are  very  different 
from  what  they  are  when  the  opposite  mood  prevails.  It  is 
also  obvious  that  reaction  times  under  such  varying  condi- 
tions vary  greatly  in  length;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  from  about 
14  to  40  sigma. 

Each  of  the  conditions  mentioned  under  this  heading  will 
come  out  in  more  detail  in  the  description  of  the  muscular 
and  sensorial  reactions.  The  reception  of  the  stimulus,  the 
action  and  the  after-effects  can  also  be  better  treated  in  the 
light  of  clearer  introspection  and  more  constant  conditions 
which  necessarily  follow  practice. 

B.     THE  MUSCULAR  REACTION.2 

In  all  but  one  of  the  observers  (P),  the  natural  reaction 
passed  over  into  the  muscular  type  after  about  40  trials, 
and  it  became  habitual,  of  course,  to  attend  to  the  move- 
ment to  be  made.  In  this,  the  conditions  are  more  easily 
described,  but  the  contents  of  consciousness  are  more  diffi- 
cult to  determine,  because  the  reaction  time  is  much  shorter 

1  See  Appendix  B. 

2  See  Appendix  C. 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  1 9 

than  in  the  sensorial.  In  the  case  where  the  observer  was 
of  the  sensorial  type,  the  same  number  of  experiments  were 
sufficient  to  establish  that  mode  of  reaction ;  and  the  times, 
though  longer  than  the  muscular,  became  much  more  regu- 
lar than  they  were  at  first. 

The  instructions  for  the  muscular  reaction  were  as  fol- 
lows: "Attend  to  the  movement  you  are  going  to  make. 
Prepare  yourself  for  the  movement,  so  you  may  be  on  the 
alert  to  move  upon  hearing  the  sound  of  the  stimulus.  The 
sense  impression  will  give  you  the  opportunity  to  make  the 
movement  you  have  been  waiting  for  since  the  'now'."  It 
is  interesting  to  notice  in  this  connection  that  the  very 
nature  of  the  reaction  experiment  seems  to  suggest  to  the 
observer  that  the  important  thing  is  the  reaction  time.  Even 
when  the  precaution  has  been  given  to  disregard  the  time 
element,  and  simply  to  '  react  upon  hearing  the  stimulus,' 
there  is  still  the  desire  to  do  it  quickly.  And  when  the  ob- 
server has  been  plainly  told  that  the  important  part  is  a  care- 
ful introspection  the  same  desire  still  persists.  The  ten- 
dency is  especially  noticeable  in  observers  whose  natural 
way  of  reacting  is  muscular  when  they  are  required  to  per- 
form the  sensorial  reaction.  They  feel  that  attending  to  the 
stimulus  is  incompatible  with  a  *  good  reaction.'  For  with 
these  the  '  good  reaction '  comes  to  mean  a  short  reaction 
time. 

In  order  to  get  a  complete  photograph  of  the  reaction, 
the  muscular  and  sensorial  reactions  were  divided  into  four 
parts :  (1)  from  the  'now'  to  the  stimulus,  (2)  the  reception 
of  the  stimulus,  (3)  the  movement,  and  (4)  the  after-effects.1 
The  whole  series  of  muscular  and  sensorial  reactions,  ac- 
cordingly, were  divided  into  four  sets  of  fifty  experiments 
each,  respectively.  The  observer  was  asked  to  throw  the 
introspective  attention  in  turn  upon  the  four  periods  men- 
tioned. First,  he  was  told  to  react  muscularly,  in  conformity 
to  the  instructions  given  above,  and  during  the  first  fifty  ex- 
periments, to  analyze  the  period  of  preparation,  i.  e.,  from 
the  '  now  '  to  the  stimulus  ;  during  the  next  fifty  experiments, 
the  introspective  attention  was  directed  to  (2)  the  reception 
of  the  stimulus  ;  and  so  on  throughout  the  four  periods.  In 
this  way,  it  was  thought,  a  more  minute,  intensive  analysis 

1Ach,  in  the  book  already  referred  to,  factored  the  reac- 
tion much  after  this  manner.  He  used  three  periods,  how- 
ever, instead  of  four:  period  of  (1)  preparation,  (2)  move- 
ment, (3)  after  effects. 

Titchener  also  suggested  this  method.  Cf.  Manual,  Vol. 
II,  Pt.  II. 


2O  COFFIN 

could  be  effected  than  would  be  obtained  by  an  equal  num- 
ber of  general  muscular  reactions.  This  same  intensive 
method  of  introspection  was  employed  with  the  sensorial 
reaction,  the  difference  being  one  of  instruction  rather  than 
introspective  method. 

I.     PREPARATION:  'Now'  TO  THE  STIMULUS 

The  time  from  the  'now'  to  the  stimulus,  or  the  time  of 
preparation,  seems  to  be  of  most  importance  and  yields  the 
greatest  amount  of  introspective  data.  The  processes  then 
at  work  give  it  its  mark  of  distinction,  and  its  peculiarity. 
Beginning  with  the  'ready,'  there  is  a  pulling  together  of 
oneself  and  a  narrowing  of  attention  to  the  business  in  hand : 
— a  voluntary  shutting  out  of  distracting  noises  and  thoughts. 
With  the  'now,'  preparation  proper  begins.  There  is  a 
tensing  of  the  muscles  of  arm,  shoulder  and  hand.  The 
observer  leans  forward,  inclines  the  head,  and  makes  the 
finger  the  focal  point  of  attention.  Analysis  shows  that  all 
this  is  constituted  of  a  countless  number  of  strains  in  all 
parts  of  the  body,  especially  about  the  arm,  finger  and  eyes. 
Images  also  play  back  and  forth  during  the  interval ;  images 
of  apparatus,  the  observer's  own  person,  kinaesthetic  images 
in  the  finger,  of  the  movement  to  be  made.1  And  these 
strains,  images,  etc.,  vary  with  the  degree  of  attention.  In 
short,  the  observer  puts  himself  in  a  special  psychophysical 
attitude.  It  consists  of  a  predisposition  to  make  a  certain 
movement,  a  summation  of  energy,  and  a  cessation  of  every- 
thing else  in  order  to  be  ready  for  the  cue  to  let  go.  One 
observer  describes  the  kinsesthetic  sensations  arising  from  it 
as  a  strange  tingling  in  the  ringer.  So  perfect  does  this 
attitude  become  that  the  attention  during  the  first  part  of  the 
interval  may  be  conceived  in  popular  terms,  as  organizing 
the  reflex,  then  leaving  it  and  engaging  itself  with  the  com- 
ing stimulus.  This  waiting  for  the  stimulus  is  often  felt  as 
a  bare  passage  of  time,  the  content  of  which  is  doubtless  to 
be  explained  in  terms  of  organic  sensations,  compressed 
feeling  about  the  heart  and  lungs  if  the  breathing  is  in  any 
way  interfered  with, — together  with  other  sensations.2  An 

1  The  point  with  regard  to  the  kinsesthetic  images  is  a  dis- 
puted one,  many  claiming  that  the   so-called  images  are  in 
reality  weak  sensations.     But  as  far   as  my  data  bear  upon 
it,  the  evidence  is  in  favor  of  such  images.     Cf.  Kiilpe,  Out- 
lines, and  James  Psych. 

2  Cf.   article  in  Meumann's  Archive  on    Descriptive   Psy- 
chology, in  which  the  author  says  the  feeling  of  the  passage 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  21 

interesting  side  light  upon  this  attitude  is  the  fact  that  the 
effort  is  felt  as  being  negative,  instead  of  positive,  during 
the  last  part  of  the  interval.  That  is,  the  observer  feels 
that  he  must  hold  back,  or  inhibit  the  tendency  to  react,  until 
the  signal  comes.  To  forget  this  is  to  react  too  soon. 

II.     THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  STIMULUS 

The  stimulus  comes  as  a  signal  to  let  go,  as  a  cue  for  the 
releasing  of  the  movement.  There  is  no  feeling  of  surprise 
or  strangeness,  as  may  be  the  case  in  the  first  few  series  of 
the  natural  reaction.  It  is  simply  expected  as  a  part  of  the 
natural  order  of  events.  Moreover,  any  noise  which  occurs 
at  the  time  of  the  expected  stimulus  is  accepted  as  the  proper 
signal.  Sometimes  the  observer  is  not  conscious  of  having 
reacted  to  the  wrong  stimulus,  and  when  he  does  become 
aware  of  it,  it  is  usually  because  of  the  sight  of  the  single 
swinging  pendulum,  or  the  different  tactual  feeling  of  the 
false  stimulus.  The  ordinary  stimulus  carries  with  it  a  cer- 
tain jar  and  vibration  which  is  lacking  in  others,  and  the 
lack  of  this  makes  the  stimulus  feel  different,  and  so  forces 
itself  into  consciousness.  But  when  the  experimenter  takes 
the  precaution,  silently  to  set  his  pendulum  swinging,  simul- 
taneously with  the  false  stimulus,  the  observer  does  not 
realize  his  error  nearly  so  easily.  This  holds  true  when  the 
false  stimulus  is  somewhat  similar  to  the  real  one,  as  the 
sound  made  by  tapping  the  table  instead  of  the  reaction  key. 
Perfectly  absurd  noises,  however,  such  as  the  snapping  of 
the  finger,  are  often  sufficient  to  set  the  movement  off,  but 
are  recognized  afterwards  as  being  false.  Sometimes  the 
sound  of  the  stimulus  hardly  enters  consciousness  at  all.  In 
such  cases,  that  which  does  seem  to  be  the  conscious  factor 
is  the  jar,  cutaneous  sensations  set  up  by  the  mechanical 
vibrations  occasioned  by  the  striking. 

It  is  interesting  in  this  connection  to  note  the  effect  of  the 
content  feeling  of  the  interval,  mentioned  above.  If  a  false 
stimulus  is  given  before  the  two-second  interval  is  over, 
there  is  little  tendency  to  react  to  it,  showing  that  the  ob- 
server has  to  have  the  'ready'  feeling  before  he  can  give 
himself  up  to  the  reaction;  also  that  he  has  learned  from 

of  time  is  the  activity  of  a  pure  thought  element,  because 
there  is  nothing  else  there. 

But  so  far  as  the  evidence  gathered  in  these  reactions 
goes,  the  passage  of  time  seems  to  be  a  perception  of  a  suc- 
cession of  organic  sensations. 

Cf.  also,  Titchener,  Manual,  Vol.  II,  Pt.  II,  pp.  395  ff. 


22  COFFIN 

experience  to  be  ready  at  the  end  of  the  two-second  interval, 
so  that  if  the  stimulus  comes  too  soon,  his  attention  is  called 
to  it,  he  recognizes  it  as  false,  and  hence  does  not  react. 
Moreover,  if  the  interval  be  shortened  and  the  right  stimulus 
is  given,  the  reaction  time  is  lengthened  and  the  experiment 
seems  less  satisfactory  to  the  observer  than  when  carried 
out  in  the  regular  time  relations.  In  other  words,  instead 
of  the  mere  sound  of  the  hammer  on  the  key,  the  real  stimu- 
lus comes  to  be  sound-of-hammer-plus-content-of-conscious- 
ness-after-'now.'  When  the  interval  is  kept  constant 
(objectively)  the  reaction  times  will  be  most  regular,  and 
the  observer  feels  the  experiment  to  be  most  satisfactory. 
If  the  intervals  are  shortened  or  lengthened,  the  reaction 
ceases  to  be  purely  motor,  and  attention  is  directed  more  or 
less  to  the  stimulus. 

III.     THE  MOVEMENT 

The  reception  of  the  stimulus,  i.  e.,  the  cue  for  the  release 
of  the  movement  and  the  release  itself,  or  the  movement,  are 
very  closely  connected  both  in  consciousness  and  in  time. 
It  is  therefore  difficult  to  discuss  them  separately.  The 
movement,  in  the  purely  muscular  type,  goes  off  with  a  jerk 
when  the  stimulus  is  heard.  The  predisposition  has  already 
been  prepared,  and  as  soon  as  the  signal  comes,  the  release 
is  made, — the  restraint  is  taken  away,  and  the  movement  has 
been  brought  about.  As  for  there  being  conscious  concomi- 
tants of  the  movement,  introspection  does  not  reveal  any. 
The  nearest  it  approaches  it,  is  in  the  recording  of  the  kinses- 
thetic  sensations  set  up  by  the  movement  itself.  In  cases 
where  the  observer  pushes  the  key  before  the  stimulus  has 
been  given,  there  may  be  either  one  of  two  causes  assigned: 
either  the  tension  in  the  ringer  is  so  great  that  the  finger  has 
simply  and  accidentally  borne  too  heavily  upon  the  key,  thus 
letting  the  pendulum  swing  unknown  to  the  observer,  which 
of  course,  is  not  a  true  reaction;  or  the  interval  measured  by 
the  content  of  consciousness  has  been  longer  than  usual 
(subjectively)  and  the  reaction  takes  place  in  response  to 
this  as  a  stimulus.  And  in  so  far  as  the  content  forms  a  part 
of  the  stimulus,  the  reaction  was  a  proper  one,  only  prema- 
ture. If  the  objective  stimulus  coincides  nearly  enough  with 
the  subjective  part,  the  reaction  times  are  short,  as  counted 
by  the  pendulum  swings  (.04,  .06,  .08,  etc.).  In  which  cases, 
it  merely  accidentally  assumes  the  appearance  of  the  normal 
reaction.  But  in  reality  should  not  be  so  counted.  Where 
the  real  interval  seems  subjectively  to  have  been  shortened, 
the  reaction  time  is  lengthened. 

In  some  cases,  the  reception  of  the  stimulus  and  the  reac- 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  23 

tion  seem  to  the  observer  to  be  simultaneous.  He  feels  no 
sequence  in  them.  But  when  he  does  recognize  the  stimulus 
to  be  followed  by  the  action,  one  would  expect  the  longer 
times  to  yield  a  greater  amount  of  introspective  material. 
But  this  is  not  the  case.  Where  there  is  a  difference  of  as 
much  as  .08  or  .10  of  a  second  there  is  no  appreciable  differ- 
ence in  introspection.  Consciousness  seems  to  be  suspended 
while  the  neuro-muscular  apparatus  gets  into  action. 

While  there  seems  to  be  no  simple  process  which  can  be 
named  and  described  during  this  time,  there  is  often,  ^  in  the 
longer  reactions  a  complex  hesitancy;  a  feeling  that  "  I  am 
not  reacting  as  promptly  as  I  could."  What  this  feeling  is, 
or  why  they  experience  it,  the  observers  cannot  tell.  One  is 
inclined  to  think  in  this  case  that  attention  has  become  a  sort 
of  ideal  spectator  which  stands  off  and  looks  on  at  the  pre- 
disposition, the  movement,  and  the  stimulus.  And  in  thus 
doing,  disables  it  to  a  slight  extent. 

IV.     THE  AFTER  EFFECTS 

The  after  effects  of  the  reaction  are  complex.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  a  letting  go,  and  easing  down  of  attention,  con- 
sciousness again  widens  out,  and  new  trains  of  thought  are 
started.  In  most  of  its  aspects,  it  seems  to  be  the  reverse 
of  the  preparation  period.  Where  there,  the  observer 
assumed  a  certain  bodily  attitude,  closed  his  eyes,  and  nar- 
rowed down  his  attention, — in  short  assumed  a  certain  psy- 
chophysical  predisposition,  we  here  find  him  relaxing  the 
body,  opening  eyes,  and  completely  getting  out  of  the  reac- 
tion attitude.  In  the  second  place, — and  more  important, — 
the  affective  tone  of  the  experiment  is  made  manifest  here. 
As  a  general  rule,  there  is  not  very  much  affective  tone  at- 
taching to  the  reaction  experiment;  and  especially  is  this  the 
case  after  much  repetition.  But  where  there  is,  it  is  shown 
in  pleasantness  caused  by  a  consciousness  of  having  per- 
formed the  experiment  satisfactorily  or  some  such  general 
feeling.  The  pleasantness  is  occasioned  by  the  whole  of  the 
complex  situation  rather  than  by  any  one  definite  sense  im- 
pression or  idea,  and  is  in  consequence,  correspondingly 
vague  and  of  little  intensity.  On  the  other  hand,  unpleasant- 
ness is  usually  occasioned  by  some  definite  strain  sensation, 
or  idea.  It  is  after  the  experiment  is  over  that  one  realizes 
that  there  has  been  discomfort,  or  uneasiness,  or  unpleasant 
strain.  Under  normal  conditions,  the  experiment  is  more 
often  of  a  general  satisfied  feeling  (pleasant)  than  with  un- 
pleasantness. 


24  COFFIN 

C.     THE  SENSORIAL  REACTION1 

The  chief  difference  to  be  found  between  this  sort  of  reac- 
tion and  the  muscular  is  mainly  in  the  first  stage,  viz.,  the 
preparation.  The  instructions  given  to  the  observer  are: 
"  You  are  to  pay  attention  to,  and  watch  for  the  stimulus. 
Do  not  bother  with  the  movement,  for  it  will  execute  itself 
when  the  time  comes.  You  must  find  some  way  of  recogniz- 
ing the  stimulus  as  the  right  one  immediately,  e.  g.,  have  an 
auditory,  visual  or  motor  image  by  which  to  recognize  it. 
You  must  be  sure  to  have  clearly  recognized  it,  so  that  you 
will  not  react  to  a  wrong  stimulus.  And  this  must  be  done 
directly,  so  that  you  shall  not  make  a  discrimination  reaction 
of  it,  by  stopping  to  decide  whether  it  is  the  right  sound  or 
not.  Simply  be  able  to  know  it,  and  to  know  it  immediately."3 

The  great  difficulty  in  this  set  of  experiments  was,  that 
these  observers,  with  one  exception,  found  it  very  difficult 
to  follow  the  instructions.  It  required  considerable  practice 
for  them  to  be  able  to  put  themselves  into  the  right  attitude. 
An  attitude  too  aggressive  and  too  active  is  as  fatal  to  the 
experiment  as  the  other  extreme  would  be. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  it  should  also  be  noted  that  the 
observers  had  been  made  acquainted  with  the  nature  of 
the  discrimination  reaction.  It  was  deemed  necessary  that 
they  should  know,  in  order  to  forestall  any  tendency  toward 
the  discrimination  reaction. 

I.     PREPARATION 

In  this,  as  in  the  muscular  reaction,  the  important  period, 
and  the  one  yielding  the  greatest  amount  of  introspective 
material,  is  the  period  of  preparation.  And  this  is  a  fact  of 
great  significance.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  second  period 
(from  the  stimulus  to  the  movement)  is  much  longer  in  this 
than  in  the  muscular  reaction,  and,  therefore,  would  seem  on 
the  face  of  it  to  contain  more,  and  to  be  of  more  importance 
in  the  simple  sensorial  reaction,  nevertheless,  here,  as  be- 
fore, the  time  of  preparation  is  of  most  importance.  It  is 
very  possible,  and  indeed  probable,  that  in  the  choice  or 
discrimination  reaction,  and  those  of  like  nature,  the  second 
period  would  be  of  the  most  importance,  for  in  them  the 
essential  and  characteristic  processes  do  take  place  in  this 
period. 

But  here,  as  in  the  muscular  reaction,  beginning  with  the 
'now/  there  are  the  numerous  strain  sensations  and  tensing 

1  See  Appendix  D. 

2Titchener:  Manual  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  Pt.  II. 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  25 

of  muscles  which  go  with  active  attention.  They  are  largely 
transferred,  however,  from  the  finger  and  hand  to  the  eye 
and  ear,  head  and  neck,  indicating  a  different  direction  of 
attention.  In  short,  the  attitude  is  one  of  listening ;  the 
hand  drops  out  of  consciousness  and  attention  turns  to  the 
expected  stimulus,  instead  of  making  the  finger  the  focal 
point.  This  is  done  differently  by  different  observers,  de- 
pending upon  their  type.  A  visually  minded  person  gets  a 
visual  image  of  the  hammer  descending  upon  the  key,  others 
have  auditory  images,  and  others  tactual1  and  muscular.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  however,  it  is  usually  a  mixture  or  combi- 
nation of  these  types.  In  the  sensorial  as  in  the  muscular, 
the  observer  develops  sort  of  a  predetermination  toward  the 
end  in  view,  as  the  preparation  progresses.  It  is  not  so 
nearly  altogether  a  muscular  affair  this  time,  however,  for 
he  holds  before  himself  a  mental  pattern  or  image,  by  which 
to  identify  the  stimulus  when  it  comes.  The  muscular  pre- 
disposition and  the  mental  image  play  into  each  other's 
hands  in  the  process  of  the  experiment.  The  business  of 
attention  is  to  create  and  hold  this  image  in  a  way  most 
easily  to  identify  the  stimulus,  if  it  be  a  correct  one,  or  to 
reject  it  if  it  be  false.  If  the  incoming  stimulus  fits  the  pat- 
tern the  movement  goes  off ;  if  not,  there  is  no  tendency  to 
move,  and  the  pressure  is  let  down.  In  the  muscular  type,  we 
said,  "  the  stimulus  is  the  cue  which  is  the  signal  to  let  go." 
In  this  type,  the  signal  is  not  merely  the  stimulus  but  a 
stimulus-of-the-right-pattern.  Anything  else  is  not  a  stimu- 
lus. Hence,  in  order  to  be  a  stimulus,  the  sound  must  fit 
the  pattern  held  in  attention. 

It  need  hardly  be  said  in  this  connection  that  this  kind  of 
reaction  is  difficult  for  muscularly  minded  people  to  make  in 
its  pure  form.  The  difficulty  is,  either  to  keep  control  of 
the  muscular  predisposition  so  as  not  to  make  a  muscular 
reaction  or  to  avoid  the  other  extreme  of  waiting  to  think 
about  and  judge  as  to  the  stimulus,  either  of  which  cases 
throws  the  experiment  out.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
when  a  false  stimulus  has  been  given,  and  the  observer  has 
kept  his  attention  maximal,  there  is  a  summation  of  energy 
which  needs  letting  down ;  and  this  is  accomplished  by  some 
characteristic  movement, —  as  by  the  jerk  of  the  head  or  the 
shrug  of  the  shoulders. 

II.     RECEPTION 

It  has  already  been  said  that  in  order  for  a  sound  to  be  a 
stimulus  it  must  fit  the  pattern  which  the  attention  actively 

1  Cf.  note  on  page  34. 


26  COFFIN 

holds.  When  the  attention  is  maximal,  z.  <?.,  when  the  pat- 
tern is  clear  and  distinct,  the  stimulus  is  apprehended  as 
right  or  wrong ;  it  either  fits,  or  it  doesn't  fit,  and  this  imme- 
diately. If  it  does  fit,  it  is  accepted  as  the  cue  for  the  re- 
lease of  the  movement.  The  interval  between  the  stimulus 
and  the  movement  is  much  longer  in  the  sensorial  reaction 
than  in  the  muscular,  and  varies  more.  The  time  is  occu- 
pied with  the  apprehension  of  the  stimulus,  i.  e.,  the  stimu- 
lus is  applied  to  the  pattern  as  it  were,  and  the  identification 
made.  When  the  attention  is  partially  distracted,  the  pat- 
tern loses  its  distinctness,  and  becomes  hazy,  and  if  the 
stimulus  comes  at  this  time  it  cannot  be  recognized  as  easily 
and  directly.  In  other  words,  the  image  has  again  to  be 
called  up  and  a  judgment  made.  When  the  attention  is  con- 
stant throughout  a  series,  the  reaction  times  vary  but 
slightly.  There  seem  to  be  all  grades  between  pure  senso- 
rial and  choice  reactions,  but  all  depends  upon  the  attention 
and  vary  with  it.  Hence,  after  the  observer  has  learned  to 
apprehend  the  stimulus  immediately,  and  when  in  condition 
to  keep  the  attention  constant,  the  experiments  become  very 
much  alike  and  reaction  times  are  constant. 

When  the  instructions  have  been  for  the  sensorial  reaction 
but  the  observer  reacts  to  a  wrong  stimulus,  either  one  of 
two  things  happens.  Either  the  attention  has  wandered,  and 
the  reaction  has  been  a  purely  muscular  one,  or  the  muscu- 
lar predisposition  has  been  so  strongly  organized  that  the 
subject  may  release  the  pendulum  when  the  attention  is 
maximal,  even  while  perceiving  the  stimulus  to  be  false,  and 
having  no  inclination  to  press  the  key.  In  this  case,  the 
movement  has  been  unconscious  to  the  observer,  and  is  not 
a  reaction  in  the  true  sense. 

When  the  objective  time  interval  between  the  '  now  'and 
the  stimulus  is  lengthened  or  shortened,  the  result  is  the  dis- 
traction of  attention,  and  in  either  case,  the  lengthening  of 
the  reaction  time.  There  is  not  such  a  content  feeling  in 
this  as  in  the  muscular  reaction,  but  there  is  a  gradual 
heightening  of  the  attention  wave,  during  the  preparation 
stage,  and  if  the  stimulus  coincides  with  the  crest  of  this 
wave,  in  point  of  time,  the  recognition  is  more  easily  made, 
and  the  reaction  time  shortened. 

III.     THE  ACTION 

Once  the  stimulus  has  been  recognized,  the  movement  is 
released,  or  better,  goes  off.  The  muscles  have  already 
been  prepared  for  the  movement,  the  muscular  predisposition 
already  effected,  as  in  the  muscular  type  of  reaction, — except 
that  the  tension  in  this  is  not  so  great.  The  organization 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  27 

has  been  mainly  unconscious,  however.  Hence,  as  soon  as 
the  signal  is  recognized,  the  movement  takes  place.  Intro- 
spection does  not  tell  us  what  the  step  or  process  between 
the  recognition  of  the  stimulus  and  the  movement  in  the  sen- 
sorial  reaction,  any  more  than  it  did  in  the  muscular.  Intro- 
spection reveals  nothing  aside  from  certain  kinaesthetic 
sensations  which  are  set  up  by  the  movement  itself,  as  in  the 
former  case.  The  movement  is  more  deliberate  in  this  case 
than  in  the  case  of  the  muscular  reaction,  however.  In  the 
latter,  the  movement  went  off  with  a  sort  of  jerk  involving 
the  whole  arm,  while  in  the  former,  it  is  an  orderly,  fully 
controlled  and  deliberate  movement.  The  reason  for  this  is 
doubtless  to  be  found  in  the  character  of  the  muscular  set  in 
each  case.  In  the  muscular  reaction,  the  tension  is  high  and 
the  strain  great,  hence  the  movement,  when  released,  goes 
off  with  a  jerk;  while  in  the  sensorial,  the  set  is  not  so  tense 
nor  the  strain  so  great,  hence  the  movement  is  made  less 
rapidly. 

The  observer  almost  always  has  a  feeling  as  to  the  quick- 
ness of  the  reaction.1  But  he  is  not  able  to  judge  with  any 
accuracy  as  to  the  length  of  the  reaction  time.  In  excep- 
tionally long  reactions  he  may  report  the  time  shorter  than 
in  others,  which  in  reality  were  shorter.  This  again  can  be 
referred  to  the  state  of  the  attention,  at  least  for  a  partial  ex- 
planation. When  the  degree  of  attention  is  maximal,  the 
reactions  are  objectively  shortest,  but  they  may  feel  longer 
to  the  observer  than  others  where  attention  has  evidently 
waned,  probably  for  the  same  reason  that  a  given  length  of 
time  seems  longer  or  shorter  under  differing  conditions,  e.  g.y 
suspense  or  composure. 

IV.     THE  AFTER  EFFECTS 

The  after  effects  are  much  the  same  in  this  as  in  the  mus- 
cular reaction,  with  this  difference.  There  is  not  felt  to  be 
so  great  a  letting  down  of  muscular  tension,  for  the  reason 
that  there  is  not  so  much  muscular  strain  to  begin  with. 
Moreover,  this  sort  of  reaction  is  a  greater  tax  on  the  atten- 
tion, and  there  is,  consequently,  a  greater  widening  out  of 
this,  at  the  end,  than  is  the  case  in  the  muscular.  In  like 
manner,  whatever  affective  tone  attaches  to  the  experiment 
makes  itself  felt  in  this  stage. 

CONCLUSIONS  FROM  THE  ANALYSIS 
With  regard  to  these  results,  it  may  be  noted  first,  that  of 

1  See  Watanby,  A.  J.,  VI,  pp.  408  ff. 


28  COFFIN 

the  four  parts  into  which  the  muscular  and  sensorial  reactions 
were  divided,  the  first  seems  to  afford  the  best  opportunity 
for  analysis.  It  is  easier  for  the  observer  to  introspect  this 
period  than  the  others;  and  as  a  consequence,  the  greatest 
amount  of  introspective  data  comes  from  it.  In  other  words, 
there  are  more  events  that  may  be  singled  out,  remembered 
and  recorded  here,  than  at  any  other  time  during  the  reac- 
tion. The  fact  that  there  is  a  greater  number  of  events  in 
this  period  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  for  that  reason, 
the  period  is  of  the  most  importance,  of  course.  It  does  not 
mean  that  it  is  any  more  essential  for  that  reason  alone.  But 
on  the  other  hand,  the  essential  processes  then  at  work,  are 
of  very  great  intrinsic  value.  Indeed  they  are  essential  fac- 
tors of  the  reaction.  If  it  were  possible  to  have  an  action 
without  conscious  antecedents,  i.  <?.,  without  some  degree  of 
attention,  then  there  would  be  no  ground  for  claiming  that 
the  processes  of  the  preparatory  stage  are  essential.  But 
since  the  very  concept  'action'  implies  a  certain  degree  of 
consciousness  and  therefore,  of  attention,  it  is  inconceivable 
that  the  action  should  take  place  without  the  initial  process 
of  directing  the  attention  to  the  business  in  hand.  We  saw 
by  the  analysis  that  everything  belonging  to  the  first  period 
was  subservient  to  the  one  process  of  appropriately  directing 
the  attention.  All  recorded  bodily  strains  were  merely  so 
many  concomitants  of  the  directing  of  attention,  and  the 
place  at  which  they  were  localized  only  branded  the  attention 
as  being  one  type  or  another.  So  that  if  there  is  any  truth 
in  our  conception  of  action,  as  implying  at  least  some  degree 
of  attention,  it  seems  that  Kulpe  was  right  in  insisting  upon 
the  importance  of  the  preparatory  stage  in  the  reaction.  Not 
only  so,  but  the  further  fact  that  the  degree,  and  direction  of 
attention  in  this  stage  determines  the  nature  and  rapidity  of 
the  reaction,  also  adds  weight  to  the  assumption. 

With  regard  to  Wundt's  content  theory.  Our  analysis  fails 
to  evince  anything  like  so  complex  a  process  in  conscious- 
ness, as  would  be  implied  by  his  perception-apperception- 
will  analysis.  In  the  muscular  type,  no  conscious  processes 
corresponding  to  each  of  these  three  things  were  recorded. 
What  is  actually  there, — what  observers  are  able  to  remem- 
ber and  write  down,  is  nothing  than  the  simple  perception  of 
the  stimulus,  after  which  nothing  more  is  known  about  the 
reaction  process,  until  kinaesthetic  sensations  come  in  telling 
of  the  actual  movement  that  is  taking,  and  has  taken  place. 
Wundt's  theory  seems  to  rest  upon  the  assumption  that  no 
idea  can  be  acted  upon  until  it  has  come  to  the  focus  of  at- 
tention, and  that  it  cannot  arrive  at  the  focus  of  attention 
except  it  come  in  through  the  'margin'  or  'fringe,'  to  use 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  29 

James's  expression;  and  more  than  this,  that  the  apperceived 
idea  cannot  be  acted  upon  until  it  is  somehow  worked  over 
into  a  will-impulse.  But  we  have  found  no  introspective 
evidence  that  would  support  this.  In  the  first  place,  action 
may  take  place,  in  which  attention  is  not  maximal,  i.  e.,  in 
which  the  idea  is  not  clearly  apperceived ;  and  in  the  second 
place,  very  many  actions  are  performed  without  a  conscious 
will-impulse  after  the  apperception  and  before  the  movement. 
In  short,  one  would  believe  Wundt's  scheme  to  be  logical 
rather  than  purely  psychological.  And  of  this,  he  seems  to 
become  partially  aware  in  the  Third  Edition;  and  in  order 
to  make  the  theory  conform  more  nearly  to  the  new  facts 
brought  to  light,  he  shrinks  one,  two,  or  all  the  processes 
up  and  crowds  two  or  all  of  them  together,  and  explains  that 
there  are  cases  of  simple  reaction  (muscular,  cerebral-reflex) 
in  which  we  do  not  have  the  three  steps  clearly  in  conscious- 
ness. But  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  he  continues  to  cling  to 
the  formal  analysis,  and  to  talk  in  terms  of  perception,  ap- 
perception and  will-impulse,  when  one  or  more  of  them  are 
not  found  at  all. 

In  the  sensorial  reaction,  the  chance  for  the  application  of 
his  scheme  is  much  better.  But,  as  was  seen  in  the  analy- 
sis, there  is  nothing  to  suggest  this  tri-parti  division.  What 
was  actually  experienced,  was  the  direct  recognition  of  the 
stimulus,  by  any  one  of  three  or  four  ways,  after  which  the 
movement  took  place  immediately.  To  be  sure,  the  stimu- 
lus in  this  case  must  be  attended  to,  and  the  greater  the  de- 
gree of  attention  it  receives  the  more  satisfactory  the 
reaction.  But  the  stimulus  is  not  consciously  worked  up 
from  the  perceptive  level  to  the  apperceptive  level.  Atten- 
tion is  already  present  to  a  marked  degree  in  preparation  in 
the  shape  of  expectation,  and  the  stimulus  is  apperceived. 
Following  at  once  upon  this  is  the  movement.  It.  takes  place 
immediately,  without  any  conscious  step  corresponding  to 
the  will-impulse,  for  the  muscular  predisposition  was  already 
prepared  in  the  beginning.  So  that  in  the  muscular  we  have, 
first,  a  high  degree  of  attention  upon  the  movement  to  be 
made,  perception  of  the  stimulus,  then  movement.  In  the 
sensorial,  we  have  high  degree  of  attention  upon  the  im- 
pression, apperception,  then  movement.  In  each  case,  the 
preparatory  attentive  state  seems  to  be  the  essential  thing 
upon  which  the  other  steps  follow  with  pre-arranged  cer- 
tainty. Hence,  the  more  closely  we  look  into  the  reaction 
consciousness,  the  more  strongly  are  we  convinced  of  the 
truth  of  Kulpe's  contention  that  the  preparatory  stage  is  the 
most  important  one,  and  that  Wundt's  content  theory  is 
rather  a  logical  one  than  strictly  a  psychological  analysis. 


30  COFFIN 

In  taking  the  simple  reaction  as  the  type  of  all  voluntary 
action,  we  are  keenly  conscious  that  we  are  making  an  ab- 
straction, and  that  in  so  far  as  it  is  abstract,  it  is  so  far  from 
the  reality  of  the  ordinary  voluntary  action.  And  more  than 
this,  we  are  aware  that  the  subdivision  of  the  reaction  into 
the  four  periods,  is  a  further  abstraction,  and,  hence,  that 
we  have  prescribed  conditions  which  probably  never  occur 
in  ordinary  action.  But  science  has  always  to  make  abstrac- 
tions, otherwise  advancement  is  impossible  :  and  it  is  only 
by  such  abstract  and  methodical  means  that  we  are  able  to 
ascertain  the  constituent  mental  processes  in  a  given  bit  of 
experience,  under  given  conditions.  So  the  facts  here  given 
regarding  consciousness  under  the  given  conditions,  must 
surely  be  of  significance  for  any  theory  of  voluntary  action 
that  may  be  advanced ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  theory 
must  take  account  of  the  facts  as  here  given. 

PART  II 

Every  science  has  its  own  terminology,  and  the  terms, 
though  very  often  drawn  from  the  general  storehouse  of 
words  in  ordinary  usage,  soon  take  on  special  meanings  per- 
taining to  the  particular  science.  In  other  words,  each 
science,  in  order  to  be  exact, 'must  employ  terms  that  have 
a  very  limited,  technical  and  definite  meaning,  that  have  in 
their  own  particular  context  a  specific  significance,  quite 
different  from  the  general  loose  meaning  of  everyday  life. 
Psychology  is  no  exception  to  this  general  rule.  It  uses  a 
terminology  quite  its  own,  and  the  better  the  psychology, 
the  more  specific  and  technical  are  the  terms  it  employs. 
This  fact  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  approaching  the  subject 
here  under  discussion.  Unfortunately,  many  psychological 
terms  have  found  their  way  into  the  science  from  philosophy, 
and  the  danger  of  confusion  is  doubly  great  in  these  instances. 
'Voluntary  action'  is  one  of  these  terms  which  has  come  to 
psychology  from  philosophy,  and  is  yet  in  common  use  in 
both.  It  also  receives  much  discussion  in  ethics  books,  and 
because  it  includes  movement,  it  also  enters  into  biological 
and  physiological  discussions.  Naturally,  then,  we  may 
expect  the  term  to  be  used  loosely  in  psychology;  and  we 
may  also  expect  a  certain  amount  of  philosophical  confusion 
as  to  its  meaning. 

The  concept  Voluntary  action'  in  the  technical  sense,  has 
found  its  place  in  all  systems  of  psychology,  and  it  will  be 
worth  our  while  to  pass  in  review  the  criteria  pertaining  to 
the  subject,  as  given  by  a  few  of  the  contemporary  writers 
on  psychology,  and  criticise  the  deliverances  of  one  or  two 


ANALYSIS  OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  31 

of  the  latest.  Titchener  says,1  "The  word  'action'  denotes 
both  the  mental  condition  and  the  mental  concomitants  of 
movement.  Movement  is,  therefore,  a  more  general  term 
than  action.  All  actions  are,  in  part,  movements,  but  only 
those  movements  which  have  conscious  processes  as  their 
condition  and  other  conscious  processes  as  their  concom- 
itants can  form  part  of  action." 

James  maintains  that  in  order  to  voluntary  action,  the 
mind  must  be  supplied  with  images  by  which  to  guide  the 
action,  at  the  time  it  is  executed.2  ''Whether  or  no  there  be 
anything  else  in  the  mind  at  the  moment  when  we  consciously 
will  a  certain  act,  a  mental  conception  made  up  of  memory 
images  of  these  sensations  defining  which  special  act  it  is, 
must  be  there.  .  .  .  My  first  thesis,  accordingly,  is  that 
there  need  be  nothing  else.  And  that  in  perfectly  simple 
voluntary  action  there  is  nothing  else  in  the  mind  but  the 
kinaesthetic  idea  thus  defined,  of  what  the  act  is  to  be. 

Hoffding  says,8  "Voluntary  action  proper  is  characterized, 
psychologically,  by  the  idea  of  the  end  of  action,  and  the 
means  to  its  realization,  and  by  a  vivid  feeling  of  the  worth 
of  that  end.  ...  A  motor  impulse  presupposes  the 
memory  of  executed  movements ;  this  may  be  either  the 
memory  of  the  appearance  of  the  movement,  or  a  motor  idea 
proper.  .  .  .  This  predisposition  or  internal  preparation 
by  means  of  which  a  movement  is,  as  it  were,  adopted  or 
fixed  in  consciousness,  does  not  admit  of  more  minute  de- 
scription. It  is  the  fundamental  element  in  the  consciousness 
of  an  intended  movement,  and  can  be  known  only  by  direct 
introspection." 

Sully's  definition  :4  "A  voluntary  action  is  an  action  con- 
sciously directed  to  some  end."  "The  fundamental  element 
of  will  is  desire."  His  analysis  of  a  simple  case  of  volun- 
tary action  follows.  "The  process  involved  in  the  simplest 
type  of  voluntary  action  may  be  described  as  follows.  The 
initial  stage  is  the  rise  of  some  desire  in  the  mind.  This 
desire  is  accompanied  by  the  representation  of  some  move- 
ment (motor  representation)  which  is  recognized  as  sub- 
serving the  realization  of  the  object.  The  recognition  of  the 
causal  relation  of  the  action  to  the  result  involves  a  germ  of 
belief  in  the  attainability  of  the  object  of  desire,  or  in  the 
efficiency  of  the  action.  Finally,  we  have  a  carrying  out  of 

kitchener:  Outlines  of  Psychology,  1899,  p.  248. 
3 James:  Psychology,  II,  p.  492. 
8  Hoffding:  Outlines  of  Psychology,  1891,  p.  318. 
4  Sully:  Outlines  of  Psychology,  1885,  p.  574. 
*  Ibid.,  575. 


32  COFFIN 

the  action  thus  represented.  This  may  be  described  as  the 
direction  of  the  active  impulse  involved  in  the  state  of  desire 
into  the  definite  channel  of  the  action  suggested.  This  last 
stage  of  the  process  of  volition  is  known  as  the  act.  The 
desire  which  precedes  and  determines  this  is  called  its 
moving  force,  stimulus  or  motive.  Since  this  motive  in- 
volves the  anticipation  of  the  final  realization,  this  consum- 
mation is  spoken  of  as  the  object,  purpose  or  end  of  the 
action,  and  correlatively,  the  action  as  the  means  of  gaining  or 
realizing  the  object  of  desire." 

Stout : 2  "Thus  we  may  define  a  volition  as  a  desire  quali- 
fied and  defined  by  the  judgment  that  so  far  as  in  us  lies,  we 
shall  bring  about  the  attainment  of  the  desired  end  because 
we  desire  it."  "A  voluntary  decision  is  normally  followed 
by  action  which  carries  or  tends  to  carry  it  into  effect."1 

Ladd  : 4  "By  a  volition  we  understand  then,  a  definite  con- 
ative  activity  consciously  directed  toward  the  realization  of 
some  mentally  represented  end,  preceded  or  accompanied  by 
the  condition  of  desire,  and  usually  accompanied  or  followed 
by  a  feeling  of  effort." 

Lotze : 5  "An  act  is  voluntary  if  the  internal  initiatory 
conditions  from  which  an  act  springs  are  approved,  adopted 
or  controlled  by  the  will,  when  they  have  taken  place." 
"We  can  only  speak  correctly  of  will  when  the  motives  of 
various  actions  and  their  values  are  compared  in  full  con- 
sciousness and  the  choice  is  made  between  them.  It  is  quite 
unreasonable  to  assume  that  we  express  by  the  words  'I 
will'  no  more  than  is  involved  in  the  future  tense  'I  shall.' ' 

Jodl :  "The  end-conscious  act  may  be  differentiated  from 
the  involuntary  or  blind  action  by  being  an  act  of  will.  Will 
is  a  narrow  effort,  a  wider  term ;  there  is  no  will  which  is 
not  effort,  but  not  all  effort  deserves  the  name  '  will,'  be- 
cause not  all  effort  carries  with  it  consciousness  of  what  it  is 
striving  for."  Every  voluntary  movement  is  characterized 
by  the  fact  that  it  is  accompanied  by  an  image  of  the  move- 
ment to  be  executed ;  but  the  will  itself  cannot  be  left  out  of 
account." 

*Ibid.,  588. 

2  Manual  of  Psychology,  1899,  p.  589. 

8 Ibid.,  p.  599. 

4  Outlines  of  Descriptive  Psychology,  1898,  p.  356. 

5  Outlines  of  Psychology,  Tr.  by  C.  L.  Herrick,  p.  66. 
*  Ibid.,  139. 

7Lehrbuch:  d.  Psychologic,  II,  p.  52. 
9  Ibid.  t  p.  61. 


ANALYSIS  OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  33 

Ward  : 1  "In  ordinary  voluntary  movement,  we  have  first 
of  all  an  idea  or  representation  of  the  movement,  and,  last 
of  all,  the  movement  itself."  "Attention  is  the  condition  of 
action." 

Many  other  psychologists  define  voluntary  action  in  much 
the  same  way,  for  example  :  Dewey  (Psychology,  1887,  p. 
359)  defines  it  as,  "Impulse  consciously  directed  toward  the 
attainment  of  a  recognized  end  which  is  felt  as  desirable.  It 
involves  knowledge  of  the  end,  knowledge  of  the  means  to 
the  accomplishment  of  the  end.  .  .  An  impulse  must  furnish 
the  force  ;  a  desire,  when  chosen,  becomes  the  motive." 

Angell  (Psychology,  1904,  p.  341)  :  "Such  acts  (volun- 
tary) always  involve  foresight  of  some  end.  This  end  is  de- 
sired or  at  least  consented  to,  and  certain  muscular  move- 
ments then  occur,  which  are  meant  to  attain  the  end." 

Murray,  in  his  Hand  Book  of  Psychology  (1887,  p.  393), 
says:  "Volitions  are  actions  consciously  directed  to  an 
end ;  and  the  problem  of  psychology  is  to  explain  the  process 
by  which  we  acquire  control  over  our  actions  so  as  to  make 
them  subserve  the  end  we  have  in  view  instead  of  being 
aimless." 

So  far,  then,  there  seems  to  be  pretty  general  agreement 
among  psychologists,  as  to  three  essentials  of  action.  (1) 
Action  is  movement  consciously  directed  toward  a  desired 
end.  The  act  itself  is  the  means  to  the  attainment  of  the 
desired  end.  (2)  Some  sort  of  imagery  is  the  necessary  condi- 
tion or  antecedent  of  the  action  :  there  must  be  memory  images 
(visual  or  kinaesthetic)  of  a  previous  movement  which  ac- 
complished the  same  end.  (3)  The  '  impulse  '  furnishes  the 
'  force  '  by  which  the  movement  is  accomplished. 

But  in  contrast  to  these  utterances  which  are  in  general 
agreement,  there  are  two  or  three  recent  writers  who  par- 
tially repudiate  the  commonly  accepted  doctrine.  Thorndike, 
in  the  preface  of  his  Elements  of  Psychology  says,  "In  one 
particular  the  author  abandons  the  accepted  doctrine  of  the 
psychology  books.  That  images  of  the  resident  and  remote 
sensations  produced  by  movement  should  be  the  usual  exci- 
tant to  the  movement  he  cannot  believe,  and  has  never 
taught."2  And  in  the  text,  his  argument  is  as  follows  :  first, 
with  regard  to  the  problem.  "Psychologists  have  argued 
much  about  what  kinds  of  mental  states  are  the  antecedents 
of  movements  in  purposive  action.  The  arguments  concern 
chiefly  (1)  the  so-called  feelings  of  innervation,  (2)  the  feel- 
ing of  decision,  of  consent,  of  '  let  this  act  be,'  the  fiat,  and 

Encyclopedia  Britannica,  9th  ed.  XX,  p.  42. 
*  Elements  of  Psychology,  1905,  p.  12. 
3 


34  COFFIN 

(3)  the  memory  images  of  the  feelings  produced  by  the 
movement."  l  The  author  follows  James  in  making  these 
images  of  two  kinds, —  images  of  '  resident '  and  '  remote  ' 
sensations.  '  Resident '  sensations  are  kinsesthetic  sensations 
due  to  the  movement ;  the  '  remote '  sensations  are  secon- 
dary sensations,  sound,  sight,  pressure,  etc.,  which  accom- 
pany movement.  He  continues,2  "  Only  recently  has  it  been 
argued  that,  after  all,  there  is  no  justification  for  the  assump- 
tion that  any  peculiar  sort  of  feeling  is  a  necessary  element 
of  purposive  action ;  that  really  any  mental  state  whatever 
may  be  the  antecedent  of  an  intentional  act.  Yet  this  seems 
easily  demonstrable.  For  instance,  I  just  now  completed 
the  purposive  action  of  writing,  '  Yet  this  seems  easily  de- 
monstrable/ The  act  was  certain  finger  movements  and 
certain  eye  movements  involved  in  guiding  them.  But  my  an- 
tecedent state  of  mind  contained  no  images  whatever  of  feel- 
ings in  my  fingers,  arms,  or  eyes,  nor  even  sight  of  the 
words.  It  was  simply  the  judgment,  *  Yet  this  seems  easily 
demonstrable,'  felt  with  the  auditory  image  of  the  words.  A 
few  hours  ago  I  signed  a  lease  and  I  can  confidently  affirm 
that  the  thought  antecedent  to  the  act  contained  no  images 
of  any  sensations  in  any  way  connected  with  the  act  of  writ- 
ing my  name,  but  only  the  auditory  images,  '  He  came  to 
my  terms  after  all.'  Professor  James,  who  maintains  that 
4 'whether  or  no  there  be  anything  else  in  the  mind  at  the 
moment  when  we  consciously  will  a  certain  act,  a  mental 
conception  made  up  of  these  sensations  (of  the  movement's 
results).  .  .  must  be  there."  (Principles,  II,  402),  gives  illus- 
trations which  prove  precisely  that  the  antecedents  to  a  move- 
ment need  never  have  been  its  results.  "We  say,  'I  must 
go  down  stairs,'  and  ere  we  know  it  we  have  risen,  walked, 
and  turned  the  handle  of  a  door."  (Idem,  p.  579.)  "Hallo  ! 
I  must  lie  here  no  longer,"  is  the  antecedent  to  getting  out 
of  bed.  In  fact,  the  doctrine  that  the  image  of  some  one  of 
the  previous  results  or  effects  of  the  movement  is  its  neces- 
sary antecedent  in  purposive  action  makes  the  perversest  of 
mistakes.  The  antecedent  is  some  one  of  its  previous  pre- 
liminaries or  causes.  Occasionally,  what  was  first  a  result 
or  effect  of  a  movement  may  later  be  thought  of  as  a  prelimi- 
nary, and  so  become  its  antecedent  in  still  later  connections. 
But  in  general  what  has  led  to  a  movement,  not  what  comes 
after  it,  will  lead  to  it  on  future  occasions.  .  .  So,  also,  there 
is  no  need  of  restricting  the  word  motive  to  any  particular 
class  of  feelings.  Any  mental  state  may  serve  as  a  motive. 


p.  281. 
*Ibid.,  p.  282. 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  35 

For  a  motive  to  an  act  is  simply  any  fact  which  assists  to  be 
present  and  to  be  approved  a  mental  state  which  will  have 
the  act  as  its  sequent." 

The  author  does  not  pass  criticism  upon  the  first  two  of 
the  problems  which  psychologists  have  argued  about  as  he 
outlines  them.  He  may,  or  may  not  accept  the  doctrine  of 
the  'feeling  of  innervation'  and  the  'fiat.'  The  opinion  of  the 
present  writer,  however,  is,  that  a  consensus  of  opinion  of 
the  present  day  psychologists  would  show  the  innervation 
theory  to  be  practically  a  dead  issue.  While  the  fiat  concept 
would  be  more  or  less  generally  accepted,  in  the  form  of 
some  doctrine  of  desire.  The  point  of  interest,  as  well  as 
the  point  at  issue  in  the  present  treatise,  however,  is  with 
regard  to  the  statment  that  "  any  mental  state  whatever  may 
be  the  antecedent  of  an  intentional  action,"  and  with  the  fur- 
ther statement  that  "controlled,  purposive  or  voluntary  action 
means,  .  .  behavior  in  which  a  purpose  is  felt,  in  what  we 
think  we  are  about,  and  act  with  foresight." 

To  begin  with,  the  author  confuses  the  problem  by  assum- 
ing that  'purposive'  and  'intended'  acts  are  the  same  as  Vol- 
untary' acts.  As  was  pointed  out  at  the  beginning  of  this 
section,  'voluntary  action'  is  one  of  the  many  technical  terms 
of  psychology,  and  as  such,  has  a  perfectly  definite  and  re- 
stricted meaning,  of  which  most  psychologists  are  aware,  as 
indicated  by  the  list  of  definitions  cited.  But — witness  the 
last  quotation — Thorndike  makes  the  terms  'purposive*  and 
'voluntary'  synonymous.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however  'pur- 
posive' is  a  very  much  wider  and  more  general  term  than 
'voluntary.'  Assuredly,  some  purposive  acts  are  voluntary, 
and  most  voluntary  acts  are  purposive,  but  the  terms  are  by 
no  means  synonymous.  One  might  as  well  speak  of  any 
movement  performed  by  the  voluntary  muscles,  as  psycho- 
logically voluntary;  thus  confusing  biological  purposiveness 
with  psychological  volition.  A  reflex  is  purposive,  and  so 
are  many  automatic  actions,  but  no  one  claims  that  they  are 
voluntary  on  this  account.  In  like  manner,  the  word  'in- 
tended' is  not  clear.  It  implies  a  higher  degree  of  mentality 
than  purposiveness,  but  here  also,  an  act  may  perfectly  well 
be  intended  and  vet  not  be  voluntary,  as  the  term  has  been 
defined  above.  Intended'  and  'voluntary'  are  certainly  over- 
lapping terms,  as  are  'purposive'  and  Voluntary,'  but  they 
are  by  no  means  synonymous.  So  the  author  has  been  led 
astray  in  his  treatment  of  action,  by  not  having  the  problem 
definitely  in  mind.  This  is  shown  very  clearly,  by  the  class 

I0p.  cit.,  p.  277. 


36  COFFIN 

of  illustrations  he  adduces  to  support  his  argument.  To 
these  illustrations,  we  will  return  presently. 

But  before  taking  up  this  point  of  special  interest,  let  us 
briefly  consider  the  paragraph  headed,  "The  feelings  produced 
by  a  movement  rarely  cause  it."  If  we  understand  the  au- 
thor correctly,  his  argument  in  this  section  depends  upon  the 
assumption  that  most  psychologists  hold  the  'resident'  or 
'remote'  images  to  be  essential  to  all  action,  which  he  himself 
calls  'purposive'  'intentional'  or  'voluntary';  that  the  essence 
of  the  motive  is  these  images.  But  the  assumption  is  ground- 
less. What  they  do  hold,  according  to  definition,  and  as  in- 
stanced by  illustration,  is  that  these  images  when  present, 
usually  accompany  or  precede  movements,  as  guides  to  them. 
In  other  words,  in  cases  where  the  movements  are  not  habit- 
ual, images  teU'which  of  an  indefinite  number  of  movements, 
is  the  appropriate  one,  which  will  most  directly  bring  about 
the  desired  end.  The  individual  has  learned  by  past  experi- 
ence, that  certain  movements  accomplish  certain  things, 
hence,  when  the  idea  of  something  to  be  accomplished  comes 
to  the  mind,  the  idea  of  the  appropriate  movement  as  a  means 
comes  up  with  it  as  an  antecedent  to  the  movement,  usually 
in  the  form  of  some  sort  of  an  image.  Where  this  is  not  the 
case, — where  ideas  of  movement  seem  distinctly  not  to  be 
present,  the  action  can  hardly  be  termed  voluntary,  in  the 
sense  of  the  definitions,  but  rather  a  sensory — or  ideo-motor, 
or  even  an  automatic  action,  in  which  the  details  of  execution 
are  handed  over  to  the  nervous  system,  where  movement 
follows  directly,  upon  representation.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  vast  majority  of  our  so-called  acts  in  the  course  of  the 
day,  are  of  this  class, — movements  which  just  go  off  of  them- 
selves when  the  proper  cue  is  received,  whatever  the  cue 
may  be.  But  the  point  which  seems  to  have  been  left  out  of 
account  by  the  author,  when  he  says  that  "any  mental  state 
whatever  may  be  the  antecedent  of  an  intentional  act "  is  the 
fact  that  in  most  voluntary  acts  of  the  ordinary  sort,  the  or- 
ganism is  predisposed  toward  a  certain  set  of  movements  by 
way  of  habit. 

A  criticism  of  the  illustrations,  above  mentioned,  will  help 
to  make  this  clear.  For  example,  he  assumes  that  he  has 
performed  a  voluntary  act  in  the  following:  "  I  just  now  com- 
pleted the  purposive  action  of  writing,"  "Yet  this  seems 
easily  demonstrable."  "  The  act  was  certain  finger  and  arm 
movements,'"  etc.  No  one  will  deny  that  this  was  a  pur- 
posive act,  but  it  was  by  no  means  voluntary,  as  the  latter  is 
commonly  and  technically  understood;  because  the  act  was 
more  than  "certain  finger  and  arm  movements."  It  com- 
prised the  mental  processes  antecedent  to  and  concomitant 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  37 

with  the  movements  involved  in  driving  the  pen.  It  involved 
the  predisposition  toward  that  kind  of  movement  as  well  as 
the  movements  themselves;  otherwise,  the  words  might  have 
been  spoken,  or  any  other  inadequate  action  made.  And 
this  predisposition  towards  writing  the  words  was  a  function 
of  attention  and  was  accomplished  in  the  general  preparation 
for  the  day's  work.  For  the  ordinary  individual,  it  must  also 
have  involved  various  images,  resident  and  remote,  at  the 
time  of  the  preparation  when  he  sat  down  at  his  desk.  But 
whether  they  were  present  or  not  just  before  the  writing  of 
that  particular  sentence,  or  in  the  general  preparation  for  the 
day's  work,  is  immaterial.  What  is  important,  is  the  fact 
that  most  psychologists  hold  that  memory  images,  resident 
and  remote,  were  highly  essential  when  the  act  of  writing 
was  being  learned;  i.  e.y  that  in  the  genesis  of  the  act,  images 
were  necessary  as  a  guide  to  the  act.  The  sort  of  act  de- 
scribed in  the  illustration  is  very  complex.  It  is  one  part  of 
a  system  of  related  acts  and  cannot  be  isolated  out  of  its  sur- 
roundings and  still  retain  its  true  relations;  i.e.,  it  cannot  be 
fully  explained  without  recourse  to  its  genesis.  The  same 
argument  applies  to  the  other  illustration  given,  viz.,  "A 
few  hours  ago,  I  signed  a  lease,  and  I  can  confidently  affirm 
that  the  thought  antecedent  to  the  act  contained  no  images 
of  any  sensation  in  any  way  connected  with  the  writing  of 
my  name."  But  here  again,  the  act  is  more  than  the  writing 
of  one's  name.  The  desired  end  was  a  lease-signed-at-my- 
own-terms.  The  agent's  coming  to  terms  is  the  cue  for  cer- 
tain predetermined  hand  movements,  and  the  real  act  was 
the  decision  that  the  end  should  be  chosen.  The  movements 
were  predetermined  in  the  general  attentive  state  preparatory 
to  the  action.  So  by  definition,  only  those  purposive  or  in- 
tended acts  which  are  voluntary,  are  held  to  have  as  an  essen- 
tial part  of  their  motives,  resident  and  remote  images  of 
previous  movements.  The  writer  of  the  illustration  has 
made  reactions  similar  to  those  instanced  so  many  times  that 
they  are  no  longer  purely  voluntary  acts,  according  to  the 
general  criteria  of  definitions  given  above,  which,  as  we 
understand  them,  imply  attention,  not  only  to  the  end  desired 
but  also  to  the  means  of  attainment.  The  acts  instanced, 
like  a  host  of  ordinarily  so-called  voluntary  acts  approach 
the  psycho-motor  act  in  character.  Titchener  says  (Primer 
of  Psychology,  1905,  p.  170),  "  So  the  impulse  degenarates. 
In  the  first  place,  the  idea  of  our  own  movement  drops  out 
of  the  motive.  .  .  The  copy,  the  movement  idea  then  dis- 
appears; it  no  longer  means  anything  to  the  organism, — and  an 
idea  owes  its  life  to  meaning  something.  Secondly,  the  idea 
of  the  result  becomes  absorbed,  so  to  speak,  in  the  precep- 


38  COFFIN 

tion  of  the  object.  .  .  The  idea  of  result  comes  to  be  merely 
a  sort  of  tag  stuck  on  the  perception."  And  it  is  to  a  class 
very  like  this  psycho-motor  action  that  the  instances  above 
quoted  belong.  For  psycho-motor  action  and  the  (what  may 
be  termed)  predetermined  action,  very  nearly  like  it  in  char- 
acter, are  not  voluntary  action  in  the  sense  of  the  definitions. 
Neither  the  author's  own  illustrations,  nor  those  quoted  from 
James  then,  belong  to  that  class  of  actions  technically  termed 
voluntary.  They  are  purposive  to  a  high  degree,  and  are 
certainly  intended,  but  they  are  not  therefore  voluntary. 

So  in  the  first  place,  the  break  which  the  author  thinks  he 
is  making  with  the  psychology  books,  in  regard  to  the  mem- 
ory images,  as  constituents  of  motives  to  action,  is  neither 
consistent  nor  complete.  It  is  inconsistent  because  the 
statement  in  the  preface  would  indicate  that  he  meant  to  predi- 
cate of  all  kinds  of  action  the  non-essentialness  of  memory 
images,  while  in  the  text,  he  leaves  out  of  account  altogether 
that  which  is  technically  termed  '  voluntary '  in  the  various 
systems  of  psychology.  And  his  break  is  incomplete  for  the 
reason  just  mentioned;  that  his  criticism  does  not  take  into 
account  what  is  technically  known  as  voluntary  action. 

There  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  Thorndike  should  not 
subscribe  to  the  general  definition  of  action  as  consciously 
conditioned  movement.  But  consciousness  implies  some  de- 
gree of  attention,  and  where  there  is  attention,  there  must  be 
something  attended  to.  Hence,  in  all  cases  of  action,  some- 
thing is  being  attended  to,  which  is  pertinent  to  the  action; 
and  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  that  this  something-attended-to 
should  be  anything  other  than  some  sort  of  an  idea  of  object 
to  be  acted  on  or  idea  of  end,  or  result  to  be  attained. 

The  present  writer's  own  introspective  analyses  of  simple 
voluntary  acts  point  very  decidedly  to  the  necessary  exist- 
ence of  quite  definite  ideas  of  end  or  result.  For  example, 
in  the  act  of  rising  to  open  the  door  in  response  to  a  knock, 
the  experience  is  as  follows:  At  the  sound  of  the  knock,  a 
startled  feeling,  the  components  of  which  seem  to  be  upon 
analysis,  a  throb  in  the  head,  a  pulsing  flush  over  neck  and 
face,  one  slower  and  stronger  heart  beat,  followed  by  an  in- 
creased rate,  a  catch  of  breath,  and  a  slight  depressing  sen- 
sation about  lungs.  Almost  simultaneously  with  the  knock, 
visual  images  of  the  door,  of  the  possible  cause  of  the  knock, 
i.  <?.,  image  of  the  hand  and  arm  on  the  outside,  with  a  more 
or  less  vague  image  of  an  individual  come  to  consciousness. 
These  images  come  simultaneously  with  the  sensations  just 
noted.  After  the  knock  has  ceased,  very  frequently  auditory 
images  of  it  recur,  as  if  it  were  continuing ;  visual  images 
of  a  moving  hand  tapping  the  door  usually  accompany  the 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  39 

auditory.  Simultaneously  with  these,  or  rather  in  rapid  alter- 
nation with  them,  the  idea,  'I  must  open  the  door  and  see 
who's  there'  arises.  This  comes  as  auditory  word  images 
accompanied  actual  movements  of  the  larynx  and  back  of 
tongue;  and  at  the  same  time,  relief  from  the  depressing 
respiratory  sensations.  With  the  idea  of  opening  the  door, 
the  movement  toward  it  actually  begins,  and  vague  images 
of  hand  and  arm  at  the  handle  arise.  Meanwhile  the  atten- 
tion is  strongly  expectant.  Word  images  of  *  who  can  it  be,' 
'  have  I  expected  any  one '  run  through  mind,  and  with  them 
visual  images  of  different  individuals  come  and  go ;  and  this 
sort  of  interplay  continues  until  the  actual  opening  of  the 
door  puts  a  stop  to  it. 

These  introspective  data  would  naturally  be  interpreted 
thus  :  The  organic  sensations  indicate  the  feeling  tone.  The 
idea  of  opening  the  door  to  see  who  is  there  is  most  assur- 
edly an  idea  of  end  or  result.  The  visual  and  auditory  im- 
ages and  the  kinaesthetic  sensations  from  throat  are  the  con- 
stituents of  expectant  attention.  The  action  is  a  reaction  to 
an  unexpected  stimulus.  Very  few  if  any  memory  images 
of  past  movements  are  present  because  the  means  of  accom- 
plishing the  desired  end  has  no  longer  to  be  attended  to. 
The  reactor  has  previously  been  placed  in  similar  positions 
an  indefinite  number  of  times,  and  his  nervous  system  has 
learned  by  practice  what  the  appropriate  movements  for  this 
kind  of  situation  are.  In  other  words,  it  is  what  may  be 
termed  a  predetermined  voluntary  action  the  condition  of 
which  is  an  antecedent  idea  of  end,  which  idea  of  end  neces- 
sarily involves  attention. 

Hence,  we  maintain,  that  if  Thorndike  means  to  include 
voluntary  in  its  technical  sense  within  '  intended '  action, 
"any  mental  state  whatever  may"  not  "be  the  antecedent 
of"  all  "intended  acts." 

APPENDIX  A 

The  method  of  questioning  the  observer  in  experimental 
tion  of  this  sort,  where  introspection  is  difficult,  is  a  valuable 
aid,  and  was  made  use  of  to  advantage  in  this  series  of  ex- 
periments. In  the  first  place,  it  is  valuable  to  the  experi- 
menter, because  he  may  induce  the  observer  to  make  his 
introspective  records  fuller  and  more  complete.  The  experi- 
menter, having  read  over  the  previous  day's  record,  is  aware 
of  the  deficiencies  and  gaps  in  the  records,  and  can  judge  as 
to  the  thoroughness  of  the  introspective  picture.  And  by 
judicious  questioning,  he  is  able  to  bring  out  points  of  im- 
portance, that  would,  perhaps,  not  have  been  brought  out 


40  COFFIN 

entirely  spontaneously; — and  all  without  danger  of  sugges- 
tion provided  the  questions  are  properly  framed.  The  ques- 
tion should  be  so  worded  that  it  merely  makes  the  observer 
aware  that  his  introspection  has  not  been  as  complete  as  de- 
sirable in  regard  to  the  point  in  question.  In  the  second 
place,  the  method  is  valuable  to  the  observer.  A  few  wisely 
directed  questions  do  much  to  add  zest  and  interest,  and 
may  each  be  made  to  appear  as  a  separate  sub-problem  to 
be  solved.  Which  problems  serve  as  something  concrete 
upon  which  to  work. 

On  the  other  hand,  valuable  as  the  method  is,  it  is  one 
which  must  be  used  with  care,  and  one  that  cannot,  with 
safety,  be  carried  too  far, —  at  the  risk  of  invalidating  the 
results. 

Cf.  Whipple,  A.  J.  XII,  424. 

F.  Angell:  Meumann's  Arch. 

APPENDIX  B 

Following  is  a  classified  list  of  introspections  selected  from 
the  daily  records.  They  are  characteristic  of  the  whole  of 
the  group,  of  which  there  is  not  space  to  include  more.  In 
each  case  the  capital  indicates  the  observer,  the  roman  nume- 
ral the  series;  and  the  figure  the  reaction  time. 

Illustrations  of  the  natural  reaction  are  taken  more  freely 
from  F  and  C  than  the  others  because  neither  of  them  had 
ever  had  any  work  in  the  reaction. 

Similar  lists  of  reaction  introspections  have  been  made  by 
others.  Cf.  Titchener,  Manual,  Vol.  I,  Pt.  II,  pp.  220  ff.  Ach, 
Willensthatigkeit;  and  Benet. 

C.  I.  40.  "Attention  divided  between  idea  of  stimulus 
and  movement  to  be  made.  Feeling  of  unreadiness, — un- 
pleasant. Strain  sensations  in  neck,  slightly  in  finger  also. 
Hazy  images." 

F.  I.  .34.  "Attention  on  sound  of  'now,'  then  visualiza- 
tion of  key;  next  to  the  coming  stimulus,  then  back  to  my 
own  person  and  key.  Slight  bodily  strain,  startled  feeling 
at  stimulus,  followed  by  visual  idea  of  key  and  of  E.  Con- 
fused." 

F.  I.  .34.  "  Slight  confusion,  then  expectant  attention  on 
E's  key;  Reaction  followed  stimulus  without  voluntary  effort. 
Time  short,  slight  relief." 

C.  I.  .16.  "Attention  on  reaction  more  fixed  because  of 
past  failure.  Muscular  strain  especially  in  muscle  used  to 
flex  finger;  singled  it  out  after  *  ready.'  Strain  in  eyes  and 
forehead." 

C.  II.  .38.     "  General  mood  of  'must-try-harder.'     Feeling 


ANALYSIS   OF  THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  41 

of  insecurity  as  to  results.  Attention  divided  between  stimu- 
lus and  reaction.  Clear  images  of  bodily  position  and  instru- 
ment." 

F.  II.  .22.  "  Attention  on  'now, 'largely passive.  No  con- 
fusion. Stimulus  was  visualized.  Conscious  of  downward 
movement  of  finger.  Relief  from  strain." 

Pn.  II.  .34.  "  Deliberate.  Sound  followed  by  visual  im- 
age of  its  cause.  Then  remembered  movement  and  pushed 
key." 

C.  II.  .10.  ''Attention  good,  almost  entirely  on  reaction. 
Clear  image  of  self.  Strain  in  forehead  and  finger;  held 
breath  from  *  now '  to  movement.  Reaction  came  with  a 
jerk,  giving  relief.  Reaction  made  before  any  image  came." 

APPENDIX  C 
Preparation 

Wrong  stimuli  were  sometimes  used,  mainly  in  order  to 
bring  out  the  nature  of  the  reception  of  the  stimulus. 

The  quotations  here  given  are  only  typical  of  a  great  num- 
ber of  similar  ones  and  are  taken  almost  at  random  from  the 
introspections  collected. 

Pn.  I.  .16.  "At  'ready,'  pulled  myself  together,  bracing 
muscles,  and  held  breath." 

P.  V.  .14.  "Visualization  of  surroundings;  strained  feel- 
ing in  head  and  arm.  Not  only  heard  stimulus,  but  visualized 
its  cause." 

P.  V.  .18.  "Visual  image  of  movement  before  it  was 
made." 

M.  V.  .18.  "  Muscular  tension  all  over;  innervation  of 
finger;  auditory  and  visual  images  of  stimulus ;  also  kinaes- 
thetic  images  in  finger."  She  also  remarks  that  "  closing 
the  eyes  seems  to  shut  out  of  consciousness  many  objects 
and  associations,  and  makes  it  easier  to  narrow  the  attention 
to  the  experiment.  The  ear  also  ceases  to  hear  disturbing 
noises  and  is  intent  on  the  coming  stimulus,  often  imaging 
it.  The  finger  is  also  keenly  sensitive  to  its  position  and 
function." 

Pn.  IV.  .12.  "Visual  image  of  swinging  pendulum  at 
coming  of  stimuli." 

M.  IV.  .16.  "Strain  sensations  in  trunk;  visual  images 
of  apparatus  and  table ;  auditory  image  of  stimulus  repeated 
three  or  four  times." 

M.  II  .16.  "Went  through  experiment  mentally,  in  its 
steps,  accompanied  by  visual,  auditory,  and  kinaesthetic 
images.  Saw  table,  experimenter,  and  apparatus ;  heard 
stimulus,  and  felt  image  of  my  movement." 


42  COFFIN 

C.  I.  .12.  "  Strain  in  head  and  finger  ;  imaged  instru- 
ment, also  position  of  myself  and  experimenter." 

C.  III.  .14.  "Attention  on  finger,  strain  in  finger,  arm 
and  head, — visual  images.  Stimulus  came  as  surprise,  and 
finger  went  off  of  itself,  yet  was  conscious  of  its  movement." 

C.  IV.  .06.  "  Visual  images  of  my  movement,  experimen- 
ter, and  apparatus.  Strain  in  forehead  and  finger  with  a 
tingling  in  the  latter." 

C.  IV.  .06.     "Strain  and  tingling  as  before." 

F.  III.  .12.  "  Strain  with  set  or  rigidity  of  muscles  of 
shoulder  and  arm." 

F.  III.  .10.  u  Visual  image  of  experimenter's  hand  and 
stick,  with  tingling  of  arm  muscles  ready  to  act." 

F.  III.  .12.  "Strain  in  head  with  forward  tendency  of 
body.  Visualization  of  instrument ;  a  general  explosive  re- 
action which  seemed  to  take  place  in  shoulder  and  arm,  and 
seemed  of  itself  to  move  the  key." 

Pn.  V.  .10.  "  Muscular  set,  then  attention  to  the  coming 
stimulus." 

Pn.  IV.  .12.  "  A  holding  back  tendency  to  avoid  previous 
error."  (Reacting  too  soon.) 

F.  II.  .14.  "Strong  inhibition  to  prevent  release  of  key 
at  'now." 

C.  III.  .14.  "After  'now,'  a  tendency  to  react,  but  con- 
sciously inhibited." 

Reception 

Pn.  IV.  .14.  "Don't  remember  stimulus  —  attention  on 
movement." 

M.  V.  .14.  "Barely  perceived  stimulus  as  sound, — just 
sufficient  to  set  off  movement." 

F.  II.  .10.  "Stimulus  the  cause  for  release,  the  reaction 
was  the  release. 

Pn.  III.  W.  S.  "  Reaction  by  kinaesthetic  sensation.  Re- 
alized afterwards  that  it  was  false  stimulus  by  lack  of  jar." 

Pn.  V.  .08.  "  Did  not  hear  stimulus,  but  reacted  to  in- 
clination to  react  to  slightest  provocation,  and  felt  jar  of 
stimulus." 

Pn.  V.  W.  S.  "  Knew  that  I  reacted  to  W.  S.  by  lack  of 
jar  and  after- vibrations  of  stimulus." 

Pn.  V.  (E  snapped  finger.-and  released  key.)  "After  reac- 
tion, a  sense  of  unsatisfactoriness  at  stimulus,  but  why,  I  do 
not  know.  It  seemed  just  like  an  echo." 

Pn.  V.  .16.  "Stimulus  indistinctly  remembered;  came 
as  natural  course  of  events." 

M.  V.  .12.  "Stimulus  not  heard  or  attended  to,  seemed 
merely  part  of  memory  image." 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  43 

Pn.  V.  (No  stimulus  given  B.)  "Reacted  when  tension 
reached  climax  and  missed  stimulus  only  after  reaction  was 
over." 

The  Movement 

F.  II.  .12.  "The  restraint  caused  by  the  preparation  au- 
tomatically removed;  followed  by  relief." 

F.  II.  .10.  "At  stimulus,  a  feeling  of  release;  reaction 
constituted  the  release." 

F.  II.  .12.  "General  explosive  reaction;  finger  seemed  of 
itself  to  move  the  key." 

C.  III.  .14.     "Great  muscular  relief  came  with  stimulus." 

C.  IV.  .15.     "Finger  seemed  to  release  itself." 

Pn.  III.  .12.  "Auditory  sensation  and  the  feeling  that  I 
am  releasing  now  while  the  sound  of  the  stroke  still  vibrates." 

Pn.  III.  Too  Soon.  "  Muscular  sensations  at  reaction, 
and  pleasantness  at  belief  of  accomplishment  of  purpose." 

Pn.  IV.  Too  soon.  "After  'now'  an  unpleasant  muscular 
strain  and  suspense.  With  stimulus,  a  decided  muscular  re- 
lief which  was  pleasant."  The  relief,  of  course,  is  the  result 
of  the  movement,  but  the  observer  evidently  thought  the 
action  was  a  response  to  a  stimulus,  which  was  not  the  case, 
for  the  stimulus  and  movement  were  simultaneous. 

Pn.  V.  Too  soon.  "Already  at  'now'  to  react.  Believe 
I  should  have  done  so  whether  the  stimulus  had  come  or  not. 
Stimulus  seemed  long  in  coming,  but  it  caused  reaction 
almost  before  it  came  to  consciousness."  In  this  reaction 
the  time  relations  are  incorrect.  The  observer  thought  she 
reacted  to  the  stimulus  when  in  reality  she  reacted  too  soon. 
The  most  reasonable  explanation,  it  seems  to  the  author,  is 
that  the  reaction  was  really  made  to  the  content  part  of  the 
stimulus,  i.e.,  when  the  interval  from  the  'now'  to  the 
stimulus  gets  about  so  full  (kinaesthetic  sensations,  breath- 
ing, etc.)  the  action  goes  off  quite  automatically  as  where  it 
is  in  direct  response  to  the  auditory  stimulus. 

Pn.  III.  .10.  "  Stimulus  and  reaction  seemed  to  coincide. 
Muscular  sensations  of  reacting ;  felt  key  coming  up." 

C.  IV.  .12.     "Response  seemed  identical  with  stimulus." 

After-effects 

Pn.  II.  .08.  "When  stimulus  came,  a  pleasant  feeling  of 
relief." 

F.  II.  .12.  "Instant  relaxation  of  arm  and  shoulder. 
Pleasant." 

C.  III.  .18.  "  Relaxation  more  pleasant  because  certain 
of  having  made  better  reaction." 

C.  V.  .10.  "  Strong  relief  with  reaction.     Pleasant." 


44  COFFIN 

APPENDIX  D 
Preparation 

C.  I.  .28.  "Attention  went  to  a  hasty  reconstruction  of 
the  impression  caused  by  previous  stimuli  as  a  pattern. 
When  the  stimulus  came,  there  was  an  immediate  compari- 
son of  the  two,  and  after  recognition,  the  movement  came  as 
a  natural  result  of  the  preparation." 

C.  I.  .28.  "Waited  a  little  after  stimulus  came  to  be  sure 
it  was  right." 

C.  I.  .28.     "  Strong  tension  about  head  in  listening" 

P.  I.  .28.  "Was  braced  nervously  and  muscularly,  to  re- 
act to  right  stimulus." 

P.  I.  .22.  "Intent  on  having  correct  stimulus,  and  reac- 
tion seemed  to  be  set  off  by  it,  as  opposed  to  any  other." 

P.  II.  .28.     ''Tried  to  recall  sound  of  previous  stimulus." 

P.  II.  28.  "An  auditory  image  of  stimulus,  and  at  coming 
of  stimulus  a  pleasant  recognition  of  it  as  identical  with 
image." 

M.  II.  .24.  "  Imaged  stimulus  kinaesthetically,  visually 
and  slightly  in  throat." 

M.  III.  .26.      '  Trying  to  ideate  the  sound  exactly." 

P.  IV.  .22.  "Attention  went  to  a  hasty  reconstruction  of 
the  stimulus,  to  be  used  as  a  pattern." 

Reception 

C.  I.  .28.     ||  Stimulus  identified  easily." 

C.  I.  .20.  "  Stimulus  seemed  to  carry  its  own  conviction 
to  consciousness,  where  something  seemed  to  hitch  onto  it, 
assuring  its  correctness." 

P.  V.  .28.  "Auditory  memory  of  sound,  and  recognized 
stimulus  as  similar  to  it." 

P.  V.  .28.  "Recognized:  in  the  sense  that  the  auditory 
qualities  of  the  sound  fitted  into  the  place  they  previously 
had,  and  still  occupied  in  consciousness." 

F.  I.  .26.  "Tried  to  recall  sound  of  stimulus.  Did  so 
partially  by  framing  vocal  reproduction  on  it.  At  stimulus, 
was  conscious  that  sound  was  that  for  which  I  had  framed 
vocal  organs." 

F.  II.  .22.  "  Failed  to  get  any  kind  of  picture  of  stimulus, 
grew  confused  and  reacted  unconsciously." 

F.  II.  .24.  "  Recalled  idea  *  sharp  '  and  '  chug/  and  con- 
structed and  auditory  pattern  of  it." 

M.  IV.  .24.     "Sound  corresponded  exactly  to  that  ideated." 

C.  I.  W.  S.  "  Reaction  not  really  caused  by  stimulus,  but 
largely  because  everything  was  ready." 


ANALYSIS   OF    THE   ACTION    CONSCIOUSNESS  45 

C.  I.  W.  S.  "  Stimulus  recognized  as  wrong,  but  finger 
pressed  key  without  conscious  volition,  due  to  tension  in  that 
member." 

M.  III.  .30.  "  Stimulus  came  in  middle  of  two  or  three 
rehearsals  of  sound  image,  in  wrong  position  in  series,  and 
made  a  hitch  in  experiment." 

The  Action 

F.  "  Usually,  the  recognition  of  the  stimulus  as  the  right 
one  is  followed  by  the  consciousness  that  the  arm  is  in 
motion." 

M.  II.  .28.  "  Stimulus  recognized  as  right,  then  felt  my 
finger  pressing  key  down." 

The  After-effects 

C.  I.  28.     "  Strong  relief  about  head,  especially." 
M.  IV.  .22.     "  Movement  gave  pleasant  relief." 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


JUN14  1949 


MAY    51956 


5De'61JB 


W^v4-1363 


LD  21-1007n-8,'34 


